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EDITORIAL 
 
COMPLIANCE IN UNPRECEDENTED TIMES 
 
Our daily life has experienced significant upheavals and cuts within the last months. 
Whereas the sufferers and their relatives are hit the hardest by the covid-19 pandemic, the 
protective measures turn our economies upside down. Thus, digital applications and re-
mote-solutions experience a shock-implementation. Now it shows how essential the in-
novative strength in the digital sector is for all of us. The topics of e-health and digital 
teaching, which have been focused on in previous issues of the journal, are coming now 
into effect – with an unforeseeable urgency. 
Therefore this edition of CEJ is dedicated to pressing criminal and compliance-related 
questions in connection with the coronavirus-pandemic. Furthermore we will focus on 
another branch of digitization: Namely cryptocurrencies and financial technology. The 
key issue of last CEJ-edition, Corporate Criminal Liability, will be deepened, as there have 
been notable (and given the current situation, questionable) developments in the German 
legislative process. Fittingly, the topic of whistleblower protection in Switzerland will be 
addressed and two books, dealing with the modern legal advice market, will be reviewed. 
We aim to continue the debates initiated by this issue and are interested in articles from 
all over the world. We eagerly await your respective impulses and hope you enjoy the lec-
ture of this special issue! 
 
With our best regards, 
 
  
Michele DeStefano & Hendrik Schneider  
Founder and Content Curators of CEJ 
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BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY - DRUG DONATIONS TO HCPS AND HCIS IN 
THE AGE OF THE CORONAVIRUS 
Kai C. Bleicken, Elisabeth Engels & Hendrik Schneider 
AUTHORS 
Attorney Kai Christian Bleicken, Managing Director of AKG e.V., Berlin.  
 
Attorney Elisabeth Engels, AKG e.V., Berlin. 
 
Prof. Hendrik Schneider, Chairman of the AKG e.V. Expert Committee “Healthcare 
Compliance Advisory Board”, proprietor of the office Gutachten&Strafverteidigung, 
Wiesbaden. 
 
AKG e.V. stands for Arzneimittel und Kooperation im Gesundheitswesen e.V. (Associa-
tion for Drugs and Cooperation in Healthcare). The AKG was founded in November 2007 
and is the organization with the largest number of members in the area of voluntary self-
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in Germany. The AKG gives top priority to 
compliance with codified rules on competition and conduct according to the practice-based 
principle of “prevention before sanction”. As a body involved in self-regulation of the phar-
maceutical industry, the AKG supports its members in ensuring transparent and fair cor-
porate conduct in the cooperation between the pharmaceutical industry and the medical 
profession. The AKG has a Code of Conduct which contains regulations for the cooperation 
of member companies with doctors, hospitals and other health care institutions and which 
is binding for member companies
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Federal Finance Minister Olaf Scholz wants to give tax concessions to companies that do-
nate disinfectants, protective masks and other medical goods during the coronavirus cri-
sis. The minister was quoted by the news agency Reuters on April 3, 2020 as follows: 
“Many donations are being made to hospitals, medical practices and nursing homes. This 
should be encouraged. Medical donations in kind are now exempt from VAT.” Such do-
nations are not only politically desirable, but also an expression of corporate social respon-
sibility, i.e. the voluntary contribution of a company to overcoming the current social and 
economic problems and a way of assuming a corresponding share of responsibility. How-
ever, these good intentions alone do not override the compliance rules and limits of crim-
inal law on permissible benefits to healthcare professionals (HCPs) and healthcare insti-
tutions (HCIs). Under German criminal law on corruption, such donations constitute 
“benefits” or “third-party benefits”, which can fall under §§ 299, 299a, 299b, 331 ff. of the 
German Criminal Code. The following limits must be observed: 
 
1. The AKG Code of Conduct covers donations, which include monetary donations and 
the donations in kind concerned here, in § 22. § 22 (1), (3) AKG Code of Conduct limits 
the permissible recipients of donations in accordance with tax law (§ 10b of the German 
Income Tax Act (EStG) and § 9 of the German Corporation Tax Act (KStG)). Accord-
ingly, donations may not be made to individuals belonging to professional groups (§ 22 
(3) AKG Code of Conduct), but only to institutions, organizations or associations of 
members of professional groups.  In this context, the Code mentions hospitals, university 
clinics and medical-scientific professional associations as examples, which as a rule fall un-
der § 10b (1) sentence 2 no. 1 EStG, § 9 (1) sentence 2 letter a KStG (legal entity under public 
law, e.g. university clinic operated in the legal form of an AöR) or under § 10b (1) sentence 
2 no. 2 EStG, § 9 (1) sentence 2 letter b KStG, in each case in conjunction with § 5 (1) no. 9 
KStG. Further conditions include the fact that the donation is made voluntarily and free 
of charge in order to promote tax benefits that help others. In this context it is not the 
internal motives that matter, but the external circumstances. A donation may therefore 
still have marketing objectives, for example, in addition to charitable and altruistic pur-
poses. In connection with the principles of separation and documentation, § 22 (1) AKG 
Code of Conduct contains the restriction that “on objective assessment of the circum-
stances under which they are made, donations cannot be understood as influencing ther-
apeutic, regulation or procurement decisions and shall be properly documented for a pe-
riod of at least five years after they have been made”. If drug donations are related to the 
additional demand caused by the crisis, this suggests that there is no possible intention to 
exercise such influence. Insofar as donations are made to HCIs and not to individual 
HCPs under the above conditions, drug donations are in compliance with the Code and 
will not be subject to criminal prosecution. Unless there is evidence to the contrary which 
suggests that there is an intention to influence decisions regarding procurement or regu-
lations, the prerequisites of an unjust agreement that would constitute a criminal offense 
as described above are not met. 
 
Medical device manufacturers are taking a somewhat different approach on the basis of 
the MedTech Europe Code of Ethical Business Practice of December 2015, section IV of 
which stipulates that grants to hospitals are generally not permitted. However, in connec-
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tion with the coronavirus crisis, the committee has allowed member companies to sup-
port hospitals to overcome the crisis under certain conditions (see “Donation and Free of 
charge loans”) by means of an additional internal guideline (MedTech Europe Code 
Committee Guidance, March 27, 2020). Donations can be made in the form of funds, 
capital goods, products, consumables, services or software (see “Types of emergency sup-
port/requests”). The donation should be related to immediate needs in connection with 
and for the duration of the coronavirus crisis (see “Donation and Free of charge loans”). 
 
3. On the other hand, donations are not permissible if the drugs are given to individual 
doctors or other HCPs. According to the AKG Code of Conduct, such donations are ex-
cluded. They fall under the prohibition of individual donations according to § 22 (3) AKG 
Code of Conduct and do not constitute permissible gifts according to § 21 AKG Code of 
Conduct. Firstly, the benefit is not granted for a reason that is explicitly covered by § 21 
(2) AKG Code of Conduct. Secondly, the prohibition of individual donations in § 22 (3) 
AKG Code of Conduct may not be circumvented by a broad interpretation of § 21 (2) 
AKG Code of Conduct (see also the interpretation principle in § 4 (1) AKG Code of Con-
duct); and thirdly, in the case of donations to individual doctors, the recipient does not 
enjoy non-profit status, which is a prerequisite for a donation as defined under tax law 
and according to § 22 AKG Code of Conduct (more detailed information: AKG (ed.), At 
a glance, 3rd edition 2018, keyword “donation”). Finally, it should be noted that doctors 
do not dispense or use medicines, but only prescribe them. Except in certain exceptional 
cases, dispensing by doctors is precluded by the prohibition in § 43 (1) of the German 
Drugs Act (AMG) and § 17 (1a) of the German Pharmacy Operation Ordinance (Ap-
BetrO). If it becomes apparent that these limits have been exceeded, the objectives pur-
sued by the provision of the medicinal products to individual doctors may be examined. 
This can at least result in the risk of investigation for an offence involving corruption. Of 
course, this is not the case if no drugs are donated, but disinfectants, breathing masks or 
protective clothing, which doctors and dentists in practices urgently need. 
 
4. Finally, the prohibition on benefits under § 7 (1) of the German Advertising of Medi-
cations Act (HWG), which also applies to HCIs pursuant to § 2 HWG, must be observed. 
In the above case of donation of, for example, disinfectants or respiratory masks, there is 
no cause for concern that § 7 (1) HWG may have been infringed, because the donations 
are not considered to be product-related sales advertising for a specific medication within 
the meaning of § 1 (1) no. 1 (unless the products in question are printed with a drug name, 
for example). Accordingly, the HWG does not apply. The situation may be different if 
the drug donation is used to advertise the use of the drug in therapy. In this case, the ad-
vertising material is identical to the advertised product. This entails the risk that the do-
nation may be unlawful pursuant to § 7 (1) HWG. A violation of § 7 (1) HWG constitutes 
an administrative offense pursuant to § 7 (1) no. 4 HWG. Since § 7 (1) HWG is a market 
conduct standard, infringement of that provision also suggests the existence of an agree-
ment which is unlawful under §§ 299, 299a, 299b and 331 et seq. of the German Criminal 
Code. 
 
5. Caution is also required if the donation of a drug is accompanied by an implied invita-
tion to off-label use. At present, various active ingredients are being used which are said 
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to be effective against coronavirus or at least have a function that supports the recovery 
process. If this relates to products that are used or are intended to be used outside of ap-
proval, the advertising ban of § 3a sentence 2 HWG applies, which is also covered by § 9 
sentence 2 AKG Code of Conduct. If it is possible to interpret the donation as advertise-
ment of off-label use, this can also be regarded as an intention to influence the donor and 
may entail the corresponding risks of prosecution under criminal law for an offence of 
corruption.  
 
In summary, donations of medications should therefore only be made to hospitals or their 
pharmacies and not to individual medical bodies or individual doctors. Professional med-
ical bodies may be institutions that enjoy tax benefits and are in principle legitimate recip-
ients of donations in kind. However, professional bodies do not treat patients, with the 
result that the legitimate purpose of the drugs is questionable and would have to be de-
fined more precisely in the context of earmarking the donation. There is no risk of conflict 
with the law if the benefits cannot also be regarded as product-related sales advertising 
and do not entail an invitation to off-label use. 
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LIABILITY FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL RISK DECISIONS DURING 
THE COVID-19 CRISIS 
Michael Kubiciel 
AUTHOR 
Michael Kubiciel is a professor of criminal law at the University of Augsburg / Germany 
and leads a research group for corporate criminal law based there. 
ABSTRACT 
The article deals with the liability of board members for decisions to minimize business 
risks resulting from the pandemic. Based on an important decision by the highest German 
criminal court on a case of the 2008 financial crisis, the article outlines the limits of a safe 
haven within which managers can make decisions without fear of legal consequences. 
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The rapidly spreading pandemic is putting companies under considerable pressure. 
Boards of directors and managing directors have to make far-reaching decisions in the 
shortest possible time with considerable uncertainty in forecasts. It is clear that not every 
decision will have the desired success; some will perhaps cause more harm than good. 
This also raises the question of civil or even criminal liability risks. A decision made by the 
BGH (German Federal Court of Justice) from 2016 is of considerable importance to an-
swering this question. It was based on facts that show structural parallels to the current 
situation. This refers to the decision on the criminal liability for breach of trust of those 
responsible at HSH Nordbank who, under great time pressure during the financial crisis 
of 2007, carried out a transaction to relieve the burden of debt, but who – as became ap-
parent later – thus caused the bank to incur a loss of just under EUR 150 million1. 
 
The responsible persons at HSH Nordbank – like many members of the management 
board in the current crisis – had to make an atypical risk decision. The object of its activi-
ties is not the ordinary course of business, which entails risks as well as new opportunities. 
Rather, measures are required to reduce risks arising from a sudden change in the business 
environment, the dynamics of which are hardly foreseeable. Mitigating these risks may 
require measures that would have been unthinkable just a few days ago – from abandon-
ing a transaction to postponing urgently needed investments, temporarily closing plants 
or applying for government deposits. 
 
When it comes to crisis management, board members and managing directors operate in 
front of an open horizon, just like politics: Only the future will tell whether the drastic 
measures are ultimately necessary and successful – but action must be taken now. In con-
trast to politics, however, managers and entrepreneurs bear a considerable personal liabil-
ity risk. If they act wrongly, they not only risk loss of reputation and, in the worst case, of 
office, but also substantial legal consequences. 
As a result, those responsible in companies find themselves in a dilemma situation in 
which both options for action – immediate action and further waiting – are risky and in 
which every decision made may prove to be wrong in retrospect. It would therefore be 
highly unfair to make the occurrence of legal consequences dependent on the outcome of 
the decision. In addition, a "negative success liability" would have harmful effects on com-
panies and the economy, as it would lead to a slowing down and distortion of decision-
making processes: Managers may be inclined to act only at a time when an option has 
			
1  BGH, NJW 2017, 578 with comments from Alexander Baur & Maximilian Holle, Untreue und unternehme-
rische Entscheidung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, 555 (2017); Michael Kubiciel, Anmerkung, JU-
RISTISCHEZEITUNG, 72, 585 (2017); Alaor Leite, Prozeduralisierung oder Rechtsgüterschutz bei der Untreue? 
- Risikoverringerung in der Unternehmenskrise am Beispiel der HSH-Nordbank-Entscheidung (BGH NJW 
2017, 578), 580 (2018); Ulrich Leimstoll, Erfordernis einer gravierenden Pflichtverletzung beim Untreuetatbe-
stand (»HSH Nordbank«), STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 388 (394) (2017). 
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expired or has proven to be clearly incorrect. Valuable time to reduce risks for the com-
pany would then be lost. 
 
In order to prevent this, case law (with different approaches that are not always con-
sistent) is trying to limit liability risks. In its HSH Nordbank decision, the 5th Criminal 
Division of the BGH (German Federal Court of Justice) clarified that a violation of (stock 
corporation law) due diligence obligations is only present in the case of "absolutely unjus-
tifiable" conduct2. 
 
It is important to know that the Criminal Division does not interpret § 266 StGB (Ger-
man Penal Code) here, but rather interprets § 93 para. 1 AktG (German Stock Companies 
Act), to which the accessory offence of breach of trust refers. The remarks of the Criminal 
Division on the clarification of the scale of obligations are therefore just as relevant for the 
application of company and liability law as for § 266 StGB. 
 
According to the opinion of the 5th Criminal Division, an "unjustifiable action" is only 
present if the mistake has already forced itself upon an outsider. What sounds like a very 
wide scale, however, becomes considerably narrower when one reads the further remarks 
of the Division. Such an error could also consist in the inadequate collection and analysis 
of information prior to a decision. 
 
However, case law also accommodates decision-makers in a crisis situation. It is necessary, 
but also sufficient, for the board of management to obtain an "appropriate" factual basis, 
taking into account the time factor and weighing up the costs and benefits of further in-
formation acquisition. It is not important that the decision was actually taken on the basis 
of adequate information and in the best interest of the company. Rather, it should suffice 
that the board of management was "reasonably" allowed to assume this at the time of the 
decision.  
These – admittedly soft – criteria provide the decision-makers in the companies with 
what they now need most urgently: a sufficiently large "safe haven" for decisions. 
			
2  for this criterion, see Michael Kubiciel, Gesellschaftsrechtliche Pflichtwidrigkeit und Untreuestrafbarkeit, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 353 (2005). 
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NON-PAYMENT OF RENT DUE TO THE CORONA PANDEMIC 
- LEGALLY AND ETHICALLY JUSTIFIABLE? 
Tim Drygala 
AUTHOR 
Prof. Dr. Tim Drygala holds the Chair for Civil Law, Commercial and Company Law at 
the University of Leipzig. 
ABSTRACT 
The announcement by Adidas, Deichmann and H&M to stop paying rent for their closed 
shops beginning in April has caused quite a stir. Tim Drygala explains why such behavior 
is covered by case law.
		
TIM DRYGALA  |  NON-PAYMENT OF RENT DUE TO THE CORONA PAN-DEMIC - LEGALLY AND ETHICALLY JUSTIFIABLE? 
 
PAGE  10 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	 IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTRACTUAL USE 11	
II.	 PANDEMIC-RELATED RIGHT TO REFUSE PERFORMANCE? 12	
III.	 NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION AND BACKTRACKING BY ADIDAS 13	
 
   
		
TIM DRYGALA  |  NON-PAYMENT OF RENT DUE TO THE CORONA PAN-DEMIC - LEGALLY AND ETHICALLY JUSTIFIABLE? 
 
PAGE  11 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
On March 25, 2020, the German legislator adopted the Law on the Mitigation of the Con-
sequences of the Corona Pandemic in Civil, Insolvency and Criminal Proceedings.1 The 
law temporarily forbids the contractual termination of tenancies. If the tenant defaults 
on a rent payment, the lessor's normal right of termination is suspended until the end of 
June, provided that the loss of payment is demonstrably due to the Corona pandemic. 
The tenant is given until mid 2022 to pay off the debt. 
 
Right after the announcement of the law, several large retail chains stated that they would 
not pay their rent for April 2020 due to the closure of the shops as ordered by the govern-
ment, although liquid funds would be available for this purpose. This led to heated dis-
cussions; in public, this type of behavior has often been seen as lacking solidarity. The 
Federal Minister of Justice announced that it would be indecent and unacceptable if fi-
nancially strong companies simply stopped paying their rent. Only if tenants actually ran 
into serious difficulties paying rent as a result of the crisis could those tenancies not be 
terminated for a limited period of time. 
 
But is this true? Political assessments need not necessarily be legally sound. Perhaps it is 
only the sense of justice that sees the lessor here as the party in need of protection and the 
tenant in the obligation to pay as long as the tenant is not threatened with insolvency. 
The Austrian General Civil Code (ABGB), which came into force as early as 1812, explic-
itly addresses the problem of epidemics in tenancy law. Art. 1104, which remains un-
changed to this day, states: “If, due to extraordinary circumstances, such as fire, war or 
epidemic, [...] the object intended to be held cannot be used or put to use at all, the owner 
of said object is not obliged to restore it, but no rent or lease payment is due.” 
I. IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONTRACTUAL USE 
 
The Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) does not refer to any risk of insolvency and/or an in-
ternal connection between the obligation to pay and the epidemic; however, the simple 
impossibility of contractual use is sufficient. And on a sobering note, there is also much 
to be said for this regulation. After all, why should the tenant continue to pay, even 
though the tenant gets nothing useful in return? And is it not the case in principle that in 
tenancy law, unlike the law on contracts for the sale of goods or for work and services, the 
risk of accidental deterioration does not pass to the tenant but to the lessor, as the lessor 
remains responsible for the fitness for use of the rented property regardless of fault? 
 
Since this is the case, German case law has extended the concept of defects in Section 536 
of the German Civil Code (BGB) despite the lack of a statutory provision. The defect can 
also be recognized as consisting of an external effect on the rental object if this directly 
affects its practical value. This is (aptly) called an ‘environmental deficiency’. 
 			
1  Annelie Kaufmann & Tanja Podolski, Das steht im Corona-Maßnahmenpaket, LTO, (Apr. 13, 2020) 
https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/corona-bundesregierung-gesetz-infektionsschutz-strafverfahren-
krankenhaus-solo-selbststaendige/. 
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Recognized examples include construction measures in an adjoining building that force 
closure of the other building (Federal Court of Justice (BGH), judgement dated April 23, 
2008, Case No. XII ZR 62/06) or the blocking of an access area (District Court of Berlin 
(KG Berlin), judgement dated November 12, 2007, Case No. 8 U 194/06). Indirect im-
pairments, in particular unexpectedly weak customer traffic in shopping malls (Federal 
Court of Justice (BGH), judgement dated February 16, 2000, Case No. XII ZR 279/97), 
are irrelevant. In the case of measures ordered by governmental authorities, it is necessary 
that the measures are directed against the operation and not against the tenant itself (Fed-
eral Court of Justice (BGH), judgement dated July 13, 2011, Case No. XII ZR 189/09). All 
this is fully 2  recognized by the courts, and the discussion is now mainly focused on 
whether this legal consequence can be limited or waived in the lessor’s contractual terms 
and conditions. 
 
On the basis of this case law, commercial tenants may rightly refuse to pay. This is because 
the usability has been rendered impossible, as the state has directly intervened against the 
operation of the business but not against the operator itself. It would be too subtle to 
argue that the business itself is not prohibited from operating, only customers have been 
prohibited from entering the business. After all, the shop is rented out as a retail store, so 
that usability as storage space or for a delivery service is not an argument. And a change of 
use would also be completely uneconomical, considering the associated rebuilding re-
quirements. More serious is the objection that the current closures do not relate to the 
leased property but to the business purpose pursued. In particular, grocery stores and 
bank branches are open regardless of their location, whereas textile and shoe shops are 
closed regardless of their location, although in the cases decided so far it was precisely the 
unfavourable location of the shop (next to a construction site, on a closed road, etc.) that 
led to an ‘environmental deficiency’ being assumed. 
 
However, it could be countered that this would increase the problem for the tenant, as 
the tenant cannot escape the current invidious situation by giving notice and changing 
location. “The 'environment' in the sense of ‘environmental deficiency' case law would 
therefore currently be the entire area affected by the closure. For the time being, we can 
only wait to see how the case law positions itself in these matters. Nonetheless, the sus-
pension of payment by tenants is not arbitrary or unjustifiable. The case law certainly 
tends towards the solution of the Austrian Civil Code - no business, no money. 
II. PANDEMIC-RELATED RIGHT TO REFUSE PERFORMANCE? 
 
The legislature is, of course, free to regulate the matter differently. And after all, according 
to the public statements made by the Minister of Justice on television and several mem-
bers of parliament on Twitter and Facebook, he believes he has already done just that. 			
2  Michael Selk, Minderung der Gewerbemiete bei behördlich angeordneter Schließung?, BECK-COMMUNITY 
(Apr. 13, 2020) https://community.beck.de/2020/03/27/minderung-der-gewerbemiete-bei-behoerdlich-ange-
ordneter-schliessung?fbclid=IwAR160UBCDb4IYMirZiZ6AAOidK80LJ_wIdDrg-
vFkFoQcTYGeAkOiVl1j3pg. 
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This leads to the crucial question: Is the Corona Mitigation Act possibly lex specialis to 
both Paragraph 536 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and the related case law? Does the 
law in fact contain no protection for the commercial tenant who could otherwise rely on 
Paragraph 536 of the German Civil Code (BGB)? Is the tenant therefore actually worse 
off? 
The wording clearly argues against this. The regulation concerning the right to refuse per-
formance in the new Art. 240 of the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EG-
BGB) Section 13 expressly does not apply to tenancy law, see there Section 1 Para. 4 No. 1. 
Furthermore, in the tenancy law regulation on the restriction of termination under Sec-
tion 2 Para. 1, reference is made to “rent due”, and rent that is reduced to zero is not due. 
However, the preamble to the law is all the more clearly based on the assumption that 
there is in itself an obligation to continue paying the rent. This is because it expressly states 
with regard to the restriction on termination: “The obligation of the tenants to pay rent 
fundamentally remains in place.” Furthermore, the law generally shows a desire to sup-
port only those who are in economic distress as a result of the pandemic. Art. 240 Section 
1 and Section 2 of the Introductory Act to the German Civil Code (EGBGB) both clearly 
indicate this. 
 
The following is apparently what happened: The Ministry of Justice overlooked Section 
536 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and the relevant case law when preparing the draft, 
and perhaps had residential rent in mind, whereby rooms remain usable. The haste with 
which the Corona Mitigation Act was passed may have contributed to this. The Ministry 
of Justice and the Bundestag tacitly assumed that a general right to refuse performance 
due to a pandemic does not exist and is not wanted by the legislature. 
Rather, the law aims to maintain the flow of services as far as possible and to help only 
those who need help due to the economic situation. The intent of the legislature becomes 
apparent in that the restriction on termination in tenancy law should remain the only 
remedy. Therefore, it seems justifiable to put the slightly unfortunate wording behind us 
as an editorial error due to the haste of the legislative procedure and to help the unspoken 
intent of the legislature to come forth: A general pandemic-related right to refuse perfor-
mance is unintentional because it only passes on the liquidity problems to the next person 
in the performance chain. For the time being, the case law on ‘environmental deficiency’ 
also takes a back seat to this. An explicit clarification by the legislature would be helpful, 
but not absolutely necessary in view of the intent expressed in the Corona Mitigation Act. 
The obligation to pay remains in force even in times of an epidemic. 
III. NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION AND BACKTRACKING BY ADIDAS 
 
The strongly hostile reaction of politicians and the public has led Adidas to rethink its 
position. While at first it was said that the company would only freeze payments to com-
mercial lessors, but would continue making payments to private lessors, on April 1, 2020, 			
3  Deutscher Bundestag, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Abmilderung der Folgen der COVID-19-Pandemie im Zi-
vil- , Insolvenz- und Strafverfahrensrecht (Apr. 13, 2020), http://dip21.bundes-
tag.de/dip21/btd/19/181/1918110.pdf 
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it was declared that rental payments would be made to all lessors. The realization has now 
prevailed that a payment freeze could possibly be even more damaging for the company 
than paying the rent for April 2020. Ultimately, however, the fear of negative customer 
reactions in the time after the shops reopen and of a loss of image was simply too great for 
Adidas - regardless of all legal arguments. Other companies that are less well known to the 
public, such as the shoe chain Deichmann, on the other hand, as far as can be seen so far, 
are sticking to the course they have taken. This is regrettable because the change of course 
by Adidas is not only in accordance with the intent of the legislature, but also makes eco-
nomic and moral sense. As individually understandable as it may be to first protect one's 
own liquidity in an imminent deflationary crisis, this behavior is just as damaging at the 
macroeconomic level. This is because, with the cessation of rental payments, the eco-
nomic difficulty shifts to the owner of the property, who must continue to bear operating 
and financing costs without having any income. If the latter, in turn, is having difficulties 
making payments, the problem will, in case of doubt, hit the bank that financed the prop-
erty, and at this point at the latest, as seen in the crisis of 2008, the state will have to step 
in. A general pandemic payment freeze is therefore a typical policy of the beggar-thy-
neighbor: Conserving one's own liquidity reserves is done at the expense of others and 
therefore ultimately of the general public. It is therefore the right policy of the legislature 
to not accept such behavior, and the public has also reacted correctly when it criticized the 
suspension of payments by liquid companies as lacking solidarity. It is to be hoped that 
this realization will also be accepted by those companies that currently have a different 
view of the situation. 
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Notwithstanding, that the latest OECD report about the effectiveness of sanctions 
against companies shows Germany in the upper class of successful enforcement the pre-
sent political coalition directing Germany had decided in their coalition agreement that a 
new act about sanctions against corporations shall be developed and pass the parliament 
before the end of the current election period. 
 
End of August last year the Secretary for Legal Affairs and Consumer Protection (BMJV) 
had leaked an internal draft of this act to the press. Since then the matter was rather silent 
up to April 21, when the BMJV contacted all relevant associations and asked for comments 
until June 12. Attached was an almost unrevised draft and the information that until now 
there is no harmonized governmental draft agreed from all ministries involved.  
 
On September 6, last year a group of experts led by Professor Saliger from the Munich 
University and three lawyers frequently asked in white collar crime matters have pub-
lished a complete draft of a bill about sanctions against corporations including the proce-
dure of internal investigations. They have named their project the Munich Concept (fur-
ther MC). 
 
They were led by the experience of a legal system in Germany suffering under a tremen-
dous work overload, causing an inacceptable duration of criminal proceedings including 
the fact that more and more cases become barred due to the statute of limitations. The 
Government’s idea how to handle this critical situation by additionally starting a new line 
of mandatory investigations without any chance how or where to find experienced staff 
for the police, the offices of the public prosecutors and also judges may be called ambi-
tious. I am afraid that implementing only this new act in nothing else than an usual pro 
forma solution, nowadays modern as governmental skill. This will finally be damaging 
the acceptance of the legal system in our country. 
 
Having laid out these facts at the beginning of this short overview let us now look at the 
most important aspects of the BMJV Draft and the Munich Concept. 
 
The BMJV draft will be applicable for almost every legal entity in Germany regardless of 
its statutes of organization or its economic parameters. The German jurisdiction will ad-
ditionally be extended worldwide as far as international rules allow. 
 
Legal entities shall be held liable for all criminal acts committed by its management or 
staff this conduct having violated existing legal obligations of the entity or has caused or 
intended to cause an illicit profit of the entity. 
 
The potential sanctions are fines, a warning with deferred fines or even liquidation of the 
entity. 
 
For big companies with a business volume of more than 100 Mio Euro p.a. the fine may 
reach the amount of ten percent of the three years average of the annual worldwide turn-
over. Even small companies may be charged with fines up to 10 Mio Euro.  
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Disgorgement of profits from illegal acts will be added to the fines. The fines may be sof-
tened if an internal investigation had been conducted and supported the clarification of 
the facts. 
 
The draft offers some range of flexibility for cases of minor importance by providing op-
tions for non or deferred prosecution agreements.  
 
One of the most important political aims is that investigations against companies will be 
a mandatory obligation of the public prosecutors. As far as I am informed only Spain 
decided that their authorities shall not have any discretion to decide whether to start an 
investigation or to dispense.  
 
That being said allow me now to describe the different approach of the MC and the major 
concerns against the draft of the BMJV.  
 
The principle of mandatory investigations by public prosecutors is an achievement of lib-
eralism in the 2nd part of the 19th century. It was not any longer at the discretion of the 
aristocracy to decide, whether to commence a criminal investigation or not. The clear legal 
obligation for the then newly designed and established authority of public prosecutors 
was to start an investigation on all information about facts which show some clue that a 
criminal offense might have occurred. 
 
The aim was that at the end of such an investigation there shall be enough evidence to 
decide whether to indict a suspect or to cease the investigation. The development of penal 
law since then is nothing less than a continuous increase of criminal offences adding more 
and more complexity. The staff in the offices of the police and the public prosecutors did 
not grow simultaneously. The consequence was and still is a significant work overload for 
the police, for the public prosecutors and for the courts. As all suspects under custody are 
necessarily handled first, cases of high complexity but without anyone in jail are post-
poned and the proceedings need more and more time from year to year. The political 
reaction was that new rules allowed the public prosecutor to cease investigations at their 
discretion after having conducted a minimum standard of investigations. Since years now 
this is the most frequent solution of investigations in Germany: the suspension of an in-
vestigation after the payment of a fine by the suspect due to an assumed low level of guilt. 
 
As of today the decision to start an investigation against a legal entity is at the discretion 
of the public prosecutors in Germany. As already mentioned, only Spain is an exemption 
in Europe and has a mandatory public investigation in corporate wrongdoing. Even after 
considering the BMJV draft’s transition period of two years there will be no chance to 
build up the experienced resources to solve the high number of additional new mandatory 
cases which have to be expected in a country with some Million legal entities. 
 
Every country governed by law needs a functioning legal system without bottlenecks as 
diligent and timely solutions are essential for the citizens’ acceptance of this system. To 
solve this issue the MC votes for a modification of the principle of mandatory proceed-
ings. Those are and will still remain necessary for every individual suspect. The MC allows 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
HANS-PETER HUBER  |  RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS TO ENHANCE  
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR CRIMINAL WRONGDOING 
 
PAGE  18 
the prosecutor to start the investigation against individuals while suspending it against a 
legal entity until the indispensable individual probe gives significant evidence for an ad-
ditional corporate wrongdoing. This will be a chance to significantly reduce the immedi-
ate need of a second research line against companies. 
 
To avoid an unmanageable increase of proceedings the MC additionally brings an exemp-
tion for all legal entities which are small foundations, non-economic, small associations 
and all those companies which fall under the definition and rules for small and medium 
sized entities of relevant EU-Law due to their number of employees or their annual turn-
over. 
 
This exclusion is based also on another important consideration: Many of the rules in the 
BMJV draft demonstrate the importance of an effective compliance system. But if we take 
a glance on the compliance directives you cannot deny that all these control mechanisms 
have been developed for really big companies as a result from lessons learned in the pub-
licly well-known cases like Siemens, Daimler or Volkswagen. Many of these compliance 
rules overstrain the means of the small and even the middle-sized companies. Mandatory 
investigations under the scope of such AAA-rules of a so-called sophisticated compliance 
system will lead to a lethal risk for many of the smaller companies which cannot fulfill all 
the requirements of this state-of-the-art compliance. The new act will destroy the present 
system of competition and lead to massive advantages of big entities. 
 
The consequences of such development will not be in the best public interest of a demo-
cratic state with a free economy and liberal society. 
 
This matter leads to another issue: Who will feel the sanctions as an unpleasant reaction 
to an illicit behavior? Who will change its own conduct in order to avoid further sanc-
tions? A legal entity will feel no pain and will not even have an interest so survive. It will 
always and only be a human being connected and related to the entity, who can show a 
reaction to punishment. Therefor the MC emphasizes the need not to focus on the com-
panies wrongdoing but to keep constantly the individual liability in mind. It follows the 
Yates Memorandum from 2015 which until now only slightly altered under the Trump 
administration 
 
Employees of a company may have participated in a wrongdoing, but on average only a 
small part of them will have been involved and the majority will be scared to lose their 
jobs or to get a reduced income due to the fines imposed on their employee. The BMJV 
draft does not mention the conflicts of interest arising from these facts. Their situation is 
out of the scope of the new act. How can a government forget or ignore the consequences 
for innocent workers? Furthermore the shareholders will feel punished without being li-
able for any individual wrongdoing of the management and in case of public incorpora-
tions even without a real chance to influence the company as an owner of for instance 
3000 shares. We know since the last financial crisis that the legal consequences of this dis-
aster caused a wide discussion in the USA about the balance between corporate and indi-
vidual responsibility. 
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Was this dispute not recognized in our country with such a tradition of work unions and 
social adjustment? Both groups, employees and shareholders are well recognized in the 
MC Their situation has to be included in any consideration how to handle a case of cor-
porate liability. Even the works council will have to be involved before imposing fines. 
And the view on consequences of all sanctions shall also include the effect of fines on 
other entities which did not where involved in any wrongdoing- The MC tries to mirror 
the complexity of an economy and shall not focus only on the payment of high fines. 
 
The MC carefully tries to set rules for internal investigations. Internal investigations fac-
tually are private investigations. A state governed by law shall not abandon its monopole 
to take care for legal proceedings in an equal manner for all citizens and entities under its 
control. If those who are powerful in what way ever will be allowed to conduct their own 
investigations on their criminal matters the system will finally collapse. Thus the govern-
ment has to carefully balance the rules under what guidelines private investigations shall 
be allowed and moreover accepted by public authorities. The MC proposes, that they 
have to be under scrutiny of the authorities from their planning to their final report. They 
are not a kind or a part of criminal defense. They are at least a part of the public obligation 
for a fair trial against everyone. But if the internal investigation follows the rules of an 
honest cooperation with the authorities they shall be honored. The BMJV draft rules that 
the defense attorney for a company shall not be conducting an internal investigation. The 
MC furthermore demands that the internal investigator has to be independent in a similar 
way as an auditor has to be to allow public reliance in his opinion. But on the other hand, 
an investigation in full cooperation with the authorities will be absolutely preferred and 
valued. Only the MC will not allow the seizure of attorney work products as the BMJV 
draft shall allow thus weakening the confidential position of lawyers without necessity. 
The MC was until now more or less disdained by the BMJV. Now as the Corona Crisis 
strikes the economy with inconceivable burden and consequences this new act will have 
the chance to destroy even those smaller legal entities which have survived the crisis. Let 
the parliament be reasonable enough to stop and postpone the act which may otherwise 
be called Corona 2.0. for companies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
By introducing the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability (VbVG)1, which was 
preceded by a prolonged discussion process2, the Austrian legislature embarked on new 
territory in criminal law. Departing from the principle that only natural persons can be 
prosecuted (“societas delinquere non potest”), the VbVG regulates the conditions under 
which entities can be held responsible for criminal acts committed within their respective 
organizational domains. 
 
The VbVG aims to prevent corporate crime. Accordingly, aspects of prevention play a 
crucial role in the Austrian manifestation of corporate criminal liability.3 Entities are ex-
pected to take active measures to prevent criminal conduct by their employees and those 
responsible for their executive bodies.4 The strong nature of the concept of prevention 
should guarantee protection for victims, make economic life more fair, and strengthen 
Austria as a place to do business.  
 
By now, any objections raised against the VbVG from the standpoint of constitutional 
law have been dispelled by the Austrian Constitutional Court (VfGH).5 The VfGH be-
lieves it is permissible to hold an entity responsible for a natural person's unlawful and 
culpable conduct if they are connected with that entity. Furthermore, the VfGH expressly 
states that the principle of culpability applies only to natural persons in individual crimi-
nal law, but not to entities. 
 
What follows is a brief overview of the VbVG’s provisions under criminal law, after which 
the article will focus on the VbVG’s frequency of application while especially considering 
the role and problem of consensus and cooperation in criminal proceedings against enti-
ties. 
 
 
 
 
			
1  BGBl I 151/2005 as ammended by BGBl I 26/2016. 
2  For historical development of the statute see: FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 30 et seq. (2006). 
3  Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 18 VbVG marginal no. 1 (Frank 
Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010); Marianne Hilf, Verfolgungsermessen und Diversion im Verbandsstraf-
verfahren, in: Strafprozessrecht im Wandel: Festschrift für Roland Miklau zum 65. Geburtstag 192 (Reinhard 
Moos et al eds., 2006); Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfah-
rungen, ANWALTSBLATT 415, 417 (2013). 
4  ErläutRV 994 BlgNR 22. GP 34. 
5  VfGH 2.12.2016, G 497/2015, G 679/2015. 
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE VbVG 
 
A. Conditions for Corporate Liability 
 
For the purposes of § 1 VbVG, “entities” (and therefore those on whom penalties are im-
posed) means legal entities governed by private or public law, registered partnerships, and 
European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs). Essential criteria for responsibility are 
that the criminal act be committed by a natural person allocable to the entity (decision 
maker or employee under § 2 VbVG) either (1) to benefit the entity or (2) in breach of one 
or more of the entity's obligations (§ 3 VbVG). Criminal acts committed by a decision 
maker may be directly allocated to the entity, but criminal acts committed by an employee 
may be allocated to the entity only if that entity has failed to take required organizational 
measures to prevent such criminal acts. 
 
B. Sanctions 
 
The entity fine (§§ 4 ff VbVG) is intended as a penalty. It is measured according to the 
“daily rate” system (meaning the entity's economic capacity), the maximum daily rate be-
ing 10,000 euros. The number of daily rates is to be measured by the court under consid-
eration of the severity of the offense (§ 5 VbVG). Since the law prescribes a maximum of 
180 daily rates, the pecuniary fine can be no more than 1.8 million euros. Under certain 
conditions, some or all of the pecuniary fine pronounced is subject to conditional leniency 
(§§ 6f VbVG). 
 
C. Alternative Forms of Action (“diversionelle Erledigung”) 
 
Not least due to considerations of procedural economy, § 19 VbVG provides for the pos-
sibility of (intervening) alternative forms of action (“diversionelle Erledigung”) for of-
fenses punishable by prison terms of five years or less. “Alternative” primarily means a 
“diversion” from the normal response to criminal conduct, a diversion that considerably 
shortens the respective proceedings. Settling corporate criminal proceedings by way of 
such a diversion requires that the facts of the case be sufficiently clear. The facts of the 
case are deemed “sufficiently clear” if a high probability of conviction6 exists. Moreover, 
such a diversion is permitted in corporate criminal proceedings only if the proceedings 
cannot be terminated without consequences and a procedure in accordance with § 18 
VbVG (the public attorney's discretion to prosecute7) is out of the question. Additional 
mandatory conditions are the full compensation for the damage and the curing of the act's 
			
6  Hans Valentin Schroll & Robert Kert, in: Wiener Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 198 marginal no. 3 
(Helmut Fuchs & Eckart Ratz, 2016); HANNES SCHÜTZ, DIVERSIONSENTSCHEIDUNGEN IM STRAFRECHT 
55 (2003). 
7  See II. D. 
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consequences.8 The public prosecutor's office or the court must also take special and gen-
eral preventive considerations 9  into account in a procedure in accordance with § 19 
VbVG. 
 
In proceedings against entities, paying a monetary amount of fifty daily rates or less, spec-
ifying a probational period, and rendering community service are foreseen as alternative 
measures. 
 
Since the alternative form of action is voluntary, it requires the consent of the entity con-
cerned, which the entity gives by voluntarily assuming the alternative obligations de-
manded in the offer made by the public prosecutor or the court and (promptly) fulfilling 
those obligations. Successful alternative forms of action therefore require that a consensus 
be reached between the entity and the public prosecutor or the court, and effectively end 
the proceedings. 
 
D. The District Attorney's Discretion to Prosecute (“Verfolgungsermessen der 
Staatsanwaltschaft“) 
 
One of the most central provisions of the VbVG is probably the legal doctrine of the dis-
trict attorney's discretion to prosecute, which is standardized in § 18 VbVG and which 
promotes communication and consensus.10 This grants the district attorney's office a dis-
cretion that exceeds the general options for termination under the Austrian Code of 
Criminal Procedure.11 In accordance with the wording under § 18 VbVG as a decision aris-
ing from a circumscribed power and not a discretionary decision,12 the district attorney 
may refrain or (until the evidence has been collected in the main proceedings) withdraw 
from prosecuting an entity only after (completely13) weighing a series of criteria named by 
law that make prosecution and sanctions appear unnecessary. The individual criteria that 
must be weighed concern the minimal socially disruptive value of the offense at hand. But 
they must always be tied together with considerations of procedural economy and the 
goal of the punishment. Refraining from prosecution is always excluded, however, if 			
8  Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 19 VbVG marginal no. 5 (Frank 
Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010). 
9  EINHARD STEININGER; VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZ ch. 7 marginal no. 9 (2nd ed., 2018). 
10  Heidelinde Luef-Kölbl, Rolle und Problematik „konsensualer“ Verfahrenserledigungen in einem Strafprozess 
gegen Verbände, in: Unternehmensstrafrecht 369 (Marianne Lehmkuhl & Wolfgang Wohlers, 2020); Jakob 
Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich – ein 
Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq. marginal no. 2.142 (Robert Kert & 
Georg Kodek, 2016). 
11  Insofar ascribed FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 90 (2006) „experimental character“ for individual criminal proceedings 
to this article. 
12  Marianne Hilf, Verfolgungsermessen und Diversion im Verbandsstrafverfahren, in: Strafprozessrecht im Wan-
del: Festschrift für Roland Miklau zum 65. Geburtstag 201 (Reinhard Moos et al eds., 2006). 
13  A sequence or weighting of the individual criteria concerning their significance is not provided for by statute. 
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there are general or special preventive reasons for prosecuting the entity, or if such prose-
cution appears called for in light of a special public interest (§ 18(2) VbVG). Since the 
scope of application of the discretion to prosecute is not subject to any reduction, the 
district attorney may in principle refrain from prosecuting any category of offense if the 
conditions for doing so are met. Admittedly: the criterion of offense severity will set a 
limit in this case.14 
 
Therefore, the option of refraining from prosecuting an entity in accordance with 
§ 18 VbVG primarily serves to relieve the district attorney, the criminal police, and (sub-
sequently) the courts, but especially to protect the economic existence of companies as 
well.15 
III. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VbVG 
 
It must be stated in advance that the number of procedural settlements under the VbVG 
is (still) extremely low when measured against the total number of general procedural set-
tlements by the prosecuting authorities in Austria.16 This is not least attributable to the 
hesitant practice of the police regarding criminal charges. 17 However, a continual increase 
in VbVG proceedings can be recorded in recent years. For example, in 2012 there were 
only 93 final (substantive) decisions on the merits ("meritorische Entscheidungen")18, but 
in 2018 there were already 288.19 And we can probably assume this upward trend will con-
tinue during the next few years. 
 
A study20 on the VbVG’s frequency of application during 2006 to 2011, which was per-
formed five years after the VbVG took effect, essentially showed that corporate criminal 
			
14  Similarly Robert Kert, Das Verfolgungsermessen im Verbandsstrafrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- 
UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT 70, 71 (2017). 
15  Cf. Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 18 VbVG marginal no. 1 
(Frank Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010); Robert Kert, Das Verfolgungsermessen im Verbandsstrafrecht, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT 70 (2017). 
16  Bettina Knötzl, Von gefährlichen Geschenken & bestechenden Erkenntnissen zu Compliance, FACHZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT („ECOLEX“) 554 (2012) believes Austria in a „sleeping beauty slumber“ 
in terms of control corruption. 
17  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 418 (2013). 
18  Without adding substantive decisions such as abruption, separation or other conclusions. 
19  Federal Ministry of Justice, security report 2018, p. 32, justiz.gv (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.jus-
tiz.gv.at/home/justiz/daten-und-fakten/berichte/sicherheitsber-
ichte~2c94848525f84a630132fdbd2cc85c91.de.html. 
20  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE (2001), irks, 
https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf, (Apr.2, 2020). 
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proceedings were terminated without consequences with above-average frequency21 (as-
suming that they occurred in accordance with § 18 VbVG22) and that the ratio of court 
acquittal was significantly higher than those of other criminal proceedings. The study also 
showed that district attorneys did not terminate the proceedings as an alternative action 
(Diversion) as often as they terminated general proceedings in the same manner.23 This 
hesitant practice of application in the study is justified, among other reasons, by the fact 
that criminal prosecution authorities still lacked practical experiences and routines in deal-
ing with the VbVG.24 But the low frequency of application can also be attributed to res-
ervations felt by the members of the judiciary toward corporate liability.25 
 
The fact that nothing in these findings appears to have changed considerably in subse-
quent years is proven by observing the procedural settlements for VbVG proceedings 
from 2012 to 2018 as well:26 Of the (substantive)27 decisions on the merits ("meritorische 
Entscheidungen"), in the seven-year average around 80% ended through termination by 
the prosecuting authorities without consequences.28 An alternative action was used in 
around 2% of the cases. The prosecuting authorities pressed charges in around 17% of 
cases. 
 
In comparison: In general, the rate of termination by the district attorney in Austria in a 
multi-year average is around 60%, and around 16% of cases end through an alternative 
action by the district attorney. Around 24% of cases on average are settled by pressing 			
21  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 74 et seq. (2001), 
irks (Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
22  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 3 (2001), irks 
(Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
23  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 3 et seq. (2001), 
irks (Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
24  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 4 (2001), irks 
(Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
25  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 112 et seq. (2001), 
irks (Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
26  The following numbers are based on the statistical numbers of Federal Ministry of Justice, security report 2018, 
32 justiz.gv (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.justiz.gv.at/home/justiz/daten-und-fakten/berichte/sicherheitsber-
ichte~2c94848525f84a630132fdbd2cc85c91.de.html, on own calculations and may vary in total from 100 % due 
to roundings.  
27  Therefore, this is without taking the non-substantive decisions into account, which accounted for 21 % of the 
cases in this period under observation. 
28  Whereas the proceeding against accused natural persons, at the same time as the entities, were terminated in 
only about 64 % of the cases, cf. Richard Soyer & Stefan Schumann, Die „Frankfurter Thesen“ zum Unterneh-
mensstrafecht unter Einbeziehung der Erfahrungen in Österreich, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND 
STEUERSTRAFRECHT („WISTRA“) 321, 324 (2018). 
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charges.29 This shows that the trend of the first five years has continued, and that termi-
nation rates in proceedings against entities are above average, probably owing mostly to 
the district attorney’s far-reaching discretion to prosecute under § 18 VbVG.30 However, 
the displacement effect caused by the alternative form of action through the discretion to 
prosecute can also be recognized.31 This is worrying primarily regarding the principle of 
searching for substantive truth, since sufficient clarity of the facts of the case is demanded 
when alternative forms of action are taken, but this condition is lacking for proceedings 
in accordance with § 18 VbVG. 
 
Furthermore, during proceedings against entities, the procedure of the courts clearly de-
viates from the general picture. Although the average long-term acquittal rate from the 
courts lies around 15%32, main proceedings against entities end with an acquittal in around 
36% of cases on average (2012–2018). The rate of conviction generally lies at over 50% on 
average33, but only 35% on average for corporate criminal proceedings during a seven-year 
period. With alternative forms of action, on the other hand, around 16% of corporate 
criminal proceedings are ended by the courts like the general proceedings. These findings 
also support the proposition outlined above: that alternative forms of action are displaced 
through the district attorney's discretion to prosecute. 
 
In the result, it can be stated that the district attorney’s discretion to prosecute takes on a 
disproportionately high role during criminal proceedings against entities.34 One possible 
reason for this, among others, is the continuing skepticism that judicial bodies harbor 
against corporate criminal liability. But the additional expense that criminal prosecution 
authorities must incur for criminal proceedings against an entity, while facing inadequate 
opportunity for sanctions and a permanent scarcity of resources, also does its part to keep 
the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability from being applied more than hesi-
tantly and the termination rate significantly higher than those of general proceedings.35 
 
			
29  Federal Ministry of Justice, security report 2018, justiz.gv (Apr. 1, 2020) https://www.justiz.gv.at/home/jus-
tiz/daten-und-fakten/berichte/sicherheitsberichte~2c94848525f84a630132fdbd2cc85c91.de.html. 
30  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 417 (2013). 
31  This was already feared in the development of the statute: cf. FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 91 (2006). 
32  Last for 2018: 17 % (source: ministry of the interior, security report 2018, 21, bmi.gv,, (Apr. 02, 2020), 
https://www.bmi.gv.at/508/files/SIB_2018/4_SIB_2018_BMVRDJ_web.pdf. 
33  Last for 2018: 56,7 % (source: ministry of the interior, security report 2018, 21, bmi.gv,, (Apr. 02, 2020), 
https://www.bmi.gv.at/508/files/SIB_2018/4_SIB_2018_BMVRDJ_web.pdf. 
34  Similarly Lyane Sautner, Grundlagen und Herausforderungen der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit juristi-
scher Personen in Österreich, ÖSTERREICHISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG (ÖJZ) 551 (2012). 
35  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 418 (2013). 
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IV. PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY VERSUS OPPORTUNITY 
 
According to the view expressed in the legal materials on the Austrian Act on Corporate 
Criminal Liability, the district attorney’s discretion to prosecute is indeed a “regulation of 
opportunity,”36 but one which does not oppose the principle of legality which applies in 
the VbVG.37 On the other hand, the literature repeatedly expresses the view that the dis-
trict attorney’s discretion to prosecute under § 18 VbVG is not a regulation of appropri-
ateness, but should be deemed only an additional, legally determined alternative action 
that the district attorney may take38 or a (mere) restriction of the principle of legality .39 
 
However, the district attorney's discretion to prosecute does not appear unproblematic. 
The frequency of application of § 18 VbVG raises the question of whether the State’s right 
to inflict punishment can still be asserted in corporate proceedings, thereby constituting 
effective combat against criminality in associations and companies. Since the termination 
of proceedings under § 18 VbVG is not subject to the courts’ control, the district attorney's 
procedure is mostly nontransparent. At the same time, the frequency of application un-
derscores the dominant role the district attorney plays in criminal proceedings against en-
tities, since the district attorney alone may decide whether or not to avail itself of its dis-
cretion to prosecute. Admittedly, it may not decide arbitrarily, but is bound by a discre-
tion that arises from circumscribed powers by means of the prescribed criteria. However, 
this does not entitle the prosecuted entity to any subjective right to termination under 
§ 18 VbVG.40 And not least, such terminations carried out by the district attorney must 
also satisfy the determinants of the principle of equality, under which any unequal treat-
ment of accused parties must be strictly justified in fact.41 Therefore, improper termina-
tions would oppose the principle of legality. 
 			
36  Similarly Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, AN-
WALTSBLATT 415, 416 (2013); Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen 
und Verbänden in Österreich – ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq. 
marginal no. 2.133 (Robert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
37  ErläutRV 994 BlgNR 22. GP 34; also Richard Soyer & Stefan Schumann, Die „Frankfurter Thesen“ zum Un-
ternehmensstrafecht unter Einbeziehung der Erfahrungen in Österreich, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- 
UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT („WISTRA“) 321, 324 (2018) talk about an expediency article. 
38  Marianne Hilf & Fritz Zeder, in: Wiener Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, § 18 VbVG marginal no. 4 (Frank 
Höpfel & Eckart Ratz, 2nd ed., 2010); Robert Kert, Umfang und Grenzen des Opportunitätsprinzips im Ver-
bandsstrafrecht, in: Finanzstrafrecht 2016 197 et seq. (Roman Leitner & Rainer Brandl, 2017); EINHARD 
STEININGER; VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZ ch. 9 marginal no. 9 et seq. (2nd ed., 2018); Ein-
hard Steininger, Die Neuorientierung des strafprozessualen Legalitätsprinzips, JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER (JBl) 
289, 298 (1986). 
39  Richard Soyer, Gerechtigkeit – Absprachen – Korruption, JOURNAL FÜR STRAFRECHT (JSt) 37, 42 (2013). 
40  Bettina Knötzl, Von gefährlichen Geschenken & bestechenden Erkenntnissen zu Compliance, FACHZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT („ECOLEX“) 554 (2012) demands a subjective right to termination of the 
proceeding for the entity. 
41  Einhard Steininger, Die Neuorientierung des strafprozessualen Legalitätsprinzips, JURISTISCHE BLÄTTER (JBl) 
289, 298 (1986). 
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V. COOPERATION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORD-
ANCE WITH §§ 18 AND 19 VbVG 
 
Since a termination of proceedings in accordance with § 18 or 19 VbVG usually comes into 
question only if the entity exhibits positive conduct after the offense (by paying dam-
ages42, helping to clear up the case through internal investigations43, or subsequently in-
troducing compliance programs44, for example), it is recognizable that those termination 
options are closely interwoven with the entity’s willingness to cooperate.45 Moreover, 
companies are often willing to cooperate, since they have an economic interest in avoiding 
investigative procedures and a guilty verdict in accordance with the VbVG, and especially 
in being associated with as little negative publicity as possible.46 The VbVG’s general pre-
ventive effect is not least attributable to a company’s fear of negative media reports re-
garding corporate criminal proceedings conducted against that company.47  However, 
practice shows that companies do not usually fear being fined as an entity.48 With a max-
imum limit of 1.8 million euros, such fines aren't a great deterrent to companies. The first 
time an entity is convicted, courts usually pronounce only 20% to 30% of the penalty 
			
42  Cf. Heidelinde Luef-Kölbl, Rolle und Problematik „konsensualer“ Verfahrenserledigungen in einem Strafpro-
zess gegen Verbände, in: Unternehmensstrafrecht 397 (Marianne Lehmkuhl & Wolfgang Wohlers, 2020). 
43  On the topic and difficulty of internal investigations in more detail among others Norbert Wess & Markus 
Machan, Zum Anwaltsprivileg im Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen, in: Jahrbuch Wirt-
schaftsstrafrecht und Organverantwortlichkeit 2017 58 (Peter Lewisch, 2017); Lukas Staffler, Internal Investi-
gations und nemo tenetur, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT (ZWF) 174 (2018); 
Patrick Madl, Unternehmensinterne Untersuchungen im Wirtschaftsstrafverfahren, in: Das große Handbuch 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 815 et seq. (Robert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016); Norbert Wess, Unternehmensinterne 
Ermittlungen – Erfahrungen und Problemstellungen in Österreich, ANWALTSBLATT (AnwBl) 223 (2013). 
44  Cf. „Compliance“ as a group of themes in general among others Richard Soyer & Sergio Pollak, Compliance: 
Mehr als ein Mode(Zauber-)Wort, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 1013 et seq. (Robert Kert & 
Georg Kodek, 2016). 
45  Cf. in more detail Heidelinde Luef-Kölbl, Rolle und Problematik „konsensualer“ Verfahrenserledigungen in 
einem Strafprozess gegen Verbände, in: Unternehmensstrafrecht 371 et seq. (Marianne Lehmkuhl & Wolfgang 
Wohlers, 2020). 
46  Michael Rohregger & Norbert Wess, Verbandsverantwortlichkeitsgesetz, in: Praktikerkommentar Wirtschafts-
strafrecht § 1 VbVG marginal no. 7 (Mathias Preuschl & Norbert Wess 2018). 
47  WALTER FUCHS ET AL, GENERALPRÄVENTIVE WIRKSAMKEIT: PRAXIS UND ANWENDUNGSPROBLEME 
DES VERBANDSVERANTWORTLICHKEITSGESETZES (VBVG). EINE EVALUIERUNGSSTUDIE 124 (2001), irks 
(Apr.2, 2020) https://www.irks.at/assets/irks/Publikationen/Forschungsbericht/irks_vbvg_bericht.pdf. 
48  Norbert Wess et al, (Neben-)Folgen einer Verurteilung nach dem VbVG, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- 
UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT (ZWF) 54, 55 (2017); Norbert Wess & Markus Machan, Zum Anwaltsprivileg im 
Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen, in: Jahrbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und Organverantwort-
lichkeit 2017 58 (Peter Lewisch, 2017); Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept 
und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTSBLATT 415, 417 (2013). 
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range.49 Far more threatening for companies are the incidental legal consequences50 that 
judicial sentencing might bring, such as being sued for damages under civil law or banned 
from participating in public tenders51. Moreover, the loss of reputation tied to a convic-
tion52 can impair future transactions and the trust of customers or suppliers.53 Therefore, 
defence lawyers also use cooperative behaviour54 as a strategic means for convincing the 
criminal prosecution authorities that the conditions for terminating proceedings in ac-
cordance with §§ 18 or 19 VbVG have been met. However, the companies’ interest in self-
preservation55 may not blind us to the fact that there is a fine line between willingness to 
cooperate and an obligation to cooperate, especially where avoiding a conviction is con-
cerned.56 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The introduction of the Austrian Act on Corporate Criminal Liability was seen as a par-
adigm shift within Austrian criminal law.57 That estimation applies not least to the broad-
ness of the district attorney’s discretion to prosecute, which far exceeds the termination 
options under the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure and is based on the preventive 
orientation of the VbVG.58 Together with the option of termination through an alterna-
			
49  Norbert Wess & Markus Machan, Zum Anwaltsprivileg im Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Ermittlungen, 
in: Jahrbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und Organverantwortlichkeit 2017 58 (Peter Lewisch, 2017). 
50  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq., marginal no. 2.118, 2.193, (Ro-
bert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
51  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq., marginal no. 2.116 (Robert Kert 
& Georg Kodek, 2016). 
52  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq., marginal no. 2.118, 2.144 (Ro-
bert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
53  Zeder, Das österreichische Unternehmensstrafrecht (VbVG) – Konzept und erste Erfahrungen, ANWALTS-
BLATT 415, 418 (2013); Lukas Staffler, Internal Investigations und nemo tenetur, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTS- UND FINANZSTRAFRECHT (ZWF) 174 (2018). 
54  Cf. Alexia Stuefer, Strategien der Verteidigung in Wirtschaftsstrafsachen, in: Das große Handbuch Wirt-
schaftsstrafrecht 895 et seq., marginal no. 24.32 (Robert Kert & Georg Kodek, 2016). 
55  Amr Sarhan, Wie viel Kooperation zwischen Unternehmen und der Strafjustiz bei der Aufklärung verbands-
interner Kriminalität verträgt der Strafprozess?, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAF-
RECHT (WISTRA) 336, 337 (2017). 
56  Jakob Urbanek, Verbandsverantwortlichkeit: Die Strafbarkeit von Unternehmen und Verbänden in Österreich 
– ein Erfolgsmodell?, in: Das große Handbuch Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 43 et seq. marginal no. 2.144 (Robert Kert 
& Georg Kodek, 2016) believes to see "the picture of the hold-up carrot“ in § 18 VbVG. 
57  FRITZ ZEDER, VBVG 3 (2006). 
58  ErlRV 994 BlgNR 22. GP 34. 
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tive form of action, this strongly encourages a company to cooperate if investigative pro-
ceedings are initiated against an entity in accordance with the VbVG.59 From the stand-
point of the entity concerned, consensual settlement of the criminal proceedings gives 
them an opportunity to avoid a conviction (and the associated risk of farther-reaching 
financial loss) and to minimize damage. Cooperative conduct pays off for the entity, since 
all the incentives standardized under the law can allow them to expect either more lenient 
treatment when their fine is assessed or even the termination of the proceedings without 
consequences. It also allows the criminal prosecution authorities to end the criminal pro-
ceedings efficiently while preserving resources. And not least, the focus on cooperation 
and communication corresponds to the VbVG’s preventive orientation, and future-fo-
cused preventive mechanisms can in many cases make a greater contribution to rehabili-
tating the entity than can repressive reactions to criminal conduct.60 
 
The clear dominance of the terminations without consequences under § 18 VbVG in pro-
ceedings during corporate criminal offenses is surprising, however, since, although this 
regulation serves the companies’ economic existence and provides advantages in terms of 
procedural economy, it also entails risks for criminal justice — especially regarding the 
search for substantive truth. 
 
			
59  The Austrian Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) decided, as part of his validation if the Austrian 
Act on Corporate Criminal Liability (VbVG, VfGH 2.12.2016, G 497/2015, G 679/2015) is in conformity with 
the constitution, that the sanction system with reference to §§ 18 and 19 VbVG is appropriate and proportion-
ate. 
60  Rainer Brandl & Roman Leitner, Bestrafung von Verbänden für Finanzvergehen (Teil II), STEUER UND 
WIRTSCHAFTSKARTEI (SWK) 980, 983 et seq. (2018). 
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Taking into account the EU Directive on the protection of persons who 
report breaches of Union law. 
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ABSTRACT 
The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive came into force on 16 December 2019. Switzer-
land continues to struggle with this topic: the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) dis-
missed a draft law on its introduction on 3 June 2019 and, after the Swiss Council of States 
(Ständerat) approved the draft law without changes on 16 December 2019, dismissed it 
again on 5 March 2020. 
			
1  This Article has been first published in German at the Compliance Berater (Vol. 7) 2019, p. 235-242. The Au-
thor is very grateful to the Compliance Berater for allowing her to publish this translation including an update. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Whistleblowing and the protection of whistleblowers matters in the fight against national 
and international economic crime. According to an ACFE study, 40% of all cases of occu-
pational fraud are identified by reports from whistleblowers, 53% of which are employ-
ees.2 A survey of companies in Switzerland also showed that a whistle-blowing system al-
lowed half of them to uncover between 21% to 60% of their total financial losses.3 The 
European Parliament passed the EU Directive on the protection of persons who report 
breaches of Union law (EU Whistleblower Protection Directive) on 16 April 2019. The 
directive came into force on 16 December 2019.4 The EU Member States are obliged to 
incorporate these regulations within two years of publication of the directive into their 
respective national laws. 
 
To date, the explicit protection of whistleblowers has not yet been regulated in Switzer-
land, with the exception of Art. 22a of the Swiss Federal Personnel Act (Bundespersonalge-
setz), and respective cantonal regulations on personnel. Accordingly, there is a lack of legal 
certainty for employers as well as employees in particular, as the principles for the protec-
tion of whistleblowers developed by court rulings are not sufficient. For this reason, Swit-
zerland is evaluated by the OECD as insufficient in respect of the legal protection of whis-
tleblowers.5 Apart from the lack of a fundamental protection of whistleblowers, among 
others, the OECD criticizes the lack of sanctions for those who take retaliation measures 
against a whistleblower and the lack of regulations on securing the confidentiality of re-
ports and protecting the whistleblower’s identity from being disclosed.6 The gap in stat-
utory law regarding the legal protection of whistleblowers was meant to be closed by a 
law on the protection of whistleblowers. However, the draft law was clearly rejected by 
the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) on 3 June 2019 by 144 to 27 votes and again on 
			
2  ACFE, Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, 2018 Global Fraud Study, 17 (2 Mar., 2020) 
https://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2018/. 
3  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits &Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 61. 
4  DIRECTIVE (EU) 2019/1937 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 Oc-
tober 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law, OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EU-
ROPEAN UNION, L 305, 17, (2 Mar., 2020) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019L1937&from=EN. 
5  The OECD report dated 15.3.2018 states: “The examiners recommend that Switzerland adopt urgently an ap-
propriate regulatory framework to compensate and protect private sector employees who report suspicions of 
foreign bribery from any discriminatory or disciplinary action. (…) Finally, the examiners recommend that the 
Working Group should follow up on prosecutions brought in Switzerland against whistleblowers who report 
suspected financial offences including, in particular, foreign bribery.” OECD, Implementing the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: Switzerland, page 13 et seq.; (2 Mar., 2020) https://www.oecd.org/cor-
ruption/anti-bribery/Switzerland-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf. 
6  OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Report: Switzerland (15 March 2018), 16. 
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5 March 2020 by 147 to 42 votes.7 
II. HISTORY 
 
Switzerland has been discussing the protection of whistleblowers and several draft laws 
for over a decade. As early as 22 June 2007 the Swiss parliament passed the Gysin motion 
“Statutory protection of whistleblowers from corruption” (No. 03.3212). On 5 December 
2008 the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) submitted the first pre-draft of the partial 
revision of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) for consultation, and the Federal Depart-
ment of Justice and Police (FDJP) developed a bill for the consultation process. On 1 Oc-
tober 2010 a pre-draft for the partial revision of the CO on the sanctions of abusive or 
unjustified notice was opened.8 The Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) submitted a re-
port on the partial revision of the CO to the parliament on 20 November 20139 which the 
Swiss Council of States (Ständerat) accepted with few amendments on 22 September 
2014. On 5 May 2015, however, the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) clearly rejected 
the submission by 134 to 49 votes and instructed the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) 
to phrase the draft more clearly and simply.10 The Swiss Council of States (Ständerat) 
unanimously agreed to the rejection of the submission.11 After this lengthy history the 
Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) affirmed anew its intention to legislate whistleblow-
ing. The council then passed an amended draft12 (CH-Draft-CO) and a corresponding 
additional report, preserving the principles of the preceding version,13 on 21 September 
2018. 
 
As both the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) and the Swiss Council of States (Stän-
derat) engaged in the draft law, the legislative process was formally in the procedure of 
reconciling after the first refusal by the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) on 3 June 
2019. The Swiss Council of States (Ständerat), however, did not follow the Swiss National 
Council (Nationalrat) and approved the draft law without changes on 16 December 2019. 			
7  Results of the voting as of 3.6.2019, viewed on 2.3.2020 under: https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbe-
trieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=46133#votum21 x respectively re-
sults of the voting as of 5 March 2020, viewed on 13 March 2020 under: https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbe-
trieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=48524#votum13. 
8  See Diana Imbach Haumüller, Whistleblowing in der Schweiz und im internationalen Vergleich – ein Bestand-
teil einer effektiven internen Kontrolle? Diss. Universität Zürich, Zürich/Basel/Genf 2011; Diana Imbach 
Haumüller, Whistleblowing – Bestandteil einer effektiven internen Kontrolle, GesKR 2013, 71 et seq.; Nicole 
Jungo, Whistleblowing – Lage in der Schweiz, recht. 2012, 65, 72 et seq. 
9  BBl 2013 9513. 
10  See Sara Licci, Codes of Conduct im Arbeitsverhältnis mit besonderem Blick auf das Whistleblowing, AJP 2015, 
1168. 
11  See the summary of the starting position in: Additional Report to the partial revision of the Swiss Code of 
Obligations (Zusatzbotschaft zur Teilrevision des Obligationenrechts (Schutz bei Meldung von Unregelmässig-
keiten am Arbeitsplatz) as of 21 September 2018 (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1411 et seq. 
12  The File Number of CH-Draft-CO is 13.094 published at BBl 2019 1433 et seq. 
13  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409 et seq. 
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The draft law was therefore resubmitted to the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat). 
The Legal Affairs Committee of the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) advised its 
council in January 2020 to stick to its resolution and not to enter into the submission.14 
Unsurprisingly, the draft law was again dismissed by the Swiss National Council (Na-
tionalrat) on 5 March 2020, with the consequence that the submission is now definitely 
rejected. 
III. THE SWISS DRAFT LAW IN LIGHT OF THE EU WHISTLEBLOWER PRO-
TECTION DIRECTIVE 
 
A. Regulatory Approach 
 
Pursuant to a current study, a large part of Swiss companies, i.e. 71.2% of large Swiss com-
panies and 50.5% of SMEs with 20 to 249 employees, have – without any statutory obli-
gation – already incorporated a reporting office for whistleblowers. The reasons for the 
incorporation of a reporting office by these Swiss companies are, in particular, to 
strengthen a corporate image of ethics and integrity and to avoid financial damages; but 
the move is also driven by an intrinsic conviction of the benefit and efficiency of a report-
ing office. The most important reasons cited for not setting up a reporting office were the 
absence of any statutory obligation and the intention to avoid a culture of denunciation.15 
 
Despite the introduction of whistleblowing systems by Swiss companies already being far 
advanced, the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) proposed to introduce statutory regula-
tions on this topic. Through these regulations the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) 
aimed to procure legal certainty in all areas. The following describes the CH-Draft-CO as 
proposed to the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat). 
 
Employees obtain the right to report16 and, in safeguarding their fiduciary duty under la-
bor law, shall receive clarity on the conditions under which they may make a report. By 
this the reporting is legitimized. The employer, when introducing internal whistleblow-
ing systems, shall receive clarity on which procedures must be complied with to reduce 
the risk that their employees will make reports to authorities or to the public. The CH-
Draft-CO thereby proposes legal incentives instead of a statutory duty to implement an 
internal reporting office. 
 			
14  Media release of the Legal Commission of the Swiss National Council as of 31 January 2020; (2 Mar., 2020) 
https://www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/mm-rk-n-2020-01-31.aspx. 
15  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits & Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 17, 18 and 20. 
16  The question whether employees are subject to a duty to report irregularities is not addressed in this article. In 
that respect see Diana Imbach Haumüller, Whistleblowing in der Schweiz und im internationalen Vergleich – 
ein Bestandteil einer effektiven internen Kontrolle? Diss. Universität Zürich, Zürich/Basel/Genf, 2011 Rn. 73; 
Sara Licci, Codes of Conduct im Arbeitsverhältnis mit besonderem Blick auf das Whistleblowing, AJP 2015, 1168, 
1180. 
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In contrast to the CH-Draft-CO, the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive obliges cor-
porates and communities that provide for a certain size to implement whistleblowing sys-
tems and determines minimum standards. 
 
B. Personal Scope of Application 
 
The CH-Draft-CO applies to reports in the context of employment relationship in the 
private sector. For this reason, the protection of whistleblowers shall be incorporated into 
the Swiss Code of Obligations (Obligationenrecht, CO). The regulations of the CH-Draft-
CO shall be embedded in connection with the fiduciary duty of an employee towards his 
or her employer and the obligation to secrecy resulting therefrom, pursuant to Art. 321a 
CO (Art. 321abis 0 et seq. CH-Draft-CO). 
 
Accordingly, voluntary, pro bono and retired employees and self-employed persons do 
not fall within the scope of application. The Swiss Federal Personnel Act (Bundesperson-
algesetz, BPG)17 applies to public service employees and regulates in Art. 22a BPG the right 
and the duty to report in the case of detected grievances.18 Customers, suppliers, share-
holders and other stakeholders with no employment relationship with the corporation 
also do not fall within the scope of application of the CH-Draft-CO, and nor do third 
parties who often are permitted to report within the whistleblowing systems of large in-
ternational groups. 
 
In practice, Swiss enterprises offer, in addition to their employees, further groups of per-
sons the possibility to use their reporting office. These groups include, among others, cus-
tomers (40.6%), shareholders (22.4%), employees of suppliers (22.4%) or competitors 
(13%).19 
 
The protection under the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive, in contrast, is not lim-
ited to the private sector but, pursuant to Art. 4, also includes public law employment 
relationships (including public officials) as well as the self-employed within the meaning 
of Art. 49 TFEU, shareholders and persons belonging to the administrative, management 
or supervisory body of an enterprise, including non-executive members, as well as volun-
teers, trainees, and persons working under the supervision and direction of contractors 
and suppliers. In addition, the protective measures also apply to facilitators and third par-
ties such as colleagues and relatives of the whistleblower. 
 
A further difference between the CH-Draft-CO and the EU Whistleblower Protection 
Directive is as follows: The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive leaves it up to the 
individual member state’s law whether the duty to implement reporting channels applies 			
17  BPG, SR 172.220.1. 
18  The BPG is not addressed any further in this article. In that respect see Nicole Jungo, Whistleblowing – Lage 
in der Schweiz, recht. 2012, 65, 68 et seq. 
19  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits & Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 38. 
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only to employers with 50 or more employees, or respectively to communities of more 
than 10,000 inhabitants (Art. 8)20. Enterprises in the financial services sector are obliged 
to implement the channels irrespective of their size (Art. 8 (4)).21 The CH-Draft-CO does 
not provide for such distinctions, with the result that the regulations apply in theory from 
one employee and upwards; the draft, however, does not impose a duty to implement 
reporting channels. 
 
C. Material Scope of Application 
 
At present there is legal uncertainty in Switzerland for employees regarding whether and 
to whom at their place of employment they may report irregularities without breaching 
their fiduciary duty (Art. 321a para. 4 CO) and whether they render themselves liable to 
prosecution by doing so (Art. 162 Swiss Criminal Code (CH-StGB)).22 The CH-Draft-
CO addresses these aspects and states the conditions under which employees may lawfully 
report irregularities while respecting their fiduciary duty under labor law. 
  
In line with this logic, the supplementary report rules that compliance with the conditions 
for a report qualifies as a statutory justification in the meaning of Art. 41 CH-StGB. A 
whistleblower acting in compliance with the regulations of the CH-Draft-CO is therefore 
not threatened by sanctions under criminal law.23 
 
1. Irregularities 
 
Pursuant to Art. 321abis 0 CH-Draft-CO, employees may report irregularities. Criminal 
acts, breaches of statutory law, and violations of internal regulations of the employer (Art. 
321abis 0 para. 2 CH-Draft-CO)24 that come within the confidentiality duty of the em-
ployee resulting from the employment relationship (Art. 321a para. 4 CO) qualify as irreg-
ularities. This includes all confidential facts the employee learns of while in the service of 
the employer, in particular industrial and business secrets as well as all other facts which 
			
20  The regulation contained in the draft version of the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive pursuant to which 
the obligation applies only to civil law entities with an annual turnover or an annual balance of more than 
EUR 10 million is no longer part of the passed version. 
21  Based on a risk assessment, Member State rules may also oblige entities from other sectors to implement re-
porting systems, irrespective of their size (recital 48), and to incentivize smaller entities below the minimum 
size to implement reporting systems (e.g. by reducing the requirements) (recital 49); P8_TA-
PROV(2019)0366, p. 32. 
22  Art. 162 CH-StGB states: “Any person who betrays a manufacturing or trade secret that he is under a statutory 
or contractual duty contract not to reveal, any person who exploits for himself or another such a betrayal, is 
liable on complaint to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty.”; Swiss Criminal 
Code, SR 311.0 (CH-StGB). 
23  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1414. 
24  This listing is not exhaustive; Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1416. 
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the employer under certain circumstances wants to be kept confidential.25 Facts that are 
not subject to this confidentiality duty do not meet the conditions for a legitimate report 
pursuant to Art. 321abis 0 para. 2 CH-Draft-CO.26 
 
The term “irregularity” is partially non-mandatory law27 on the first level of cascade28. 
This because the employer may determine, in addition to violations of criminal and ad-
ministrative law and other statutory regulations which are verifiable by authorities, that 
further violations (e.g. of internal regulations) qualify as irregularities in the meaning of 
Art. 321abis 0 CH-Draft-CO. It is therefore at the discretion of the employer to determine 
in the corporate code of conduct what additional cases may be reported, such as cases of 
discrimination or sexual harassment. Irregularities that may be reported to authorities or 
that may be disclosed to the public are exclusively defined by law, however, and therefore 
do not fall within the non-mandatory category.29 
 
The material scope of application of the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive governs 
the minimum standard applicable to all EU Member States by referring to breaches of EU 
law in the categories listed in Art. 2. These include, in particular, public procurement, 
financial services, financial products and financial markets, the prevention of money laun-
dering and financing of terrorism, product safety, environmental protection, food safety, 
public health, customer protection, protection of privacy and personal data, and the 
safety of network and information systems. Breaches are defined as acts or omissions that 
are unlawful and relate to the above-listed areas or that defeat the object or purpose of the 
rules in these areas (Art. 5 No. 1). 
 
2. Special Case Professional Duty of Confidentiality 
 
The special case of professional duty of confidentiality must be differentiated from the 
confidentiality duty of an employee pursuant to Art. 321a para. 4 CO. In respect of em-
ployees the CH-Draft-CO contains a reservation regarding professional secrecy (Art. 321 
CH-StGB, Art. 47 CH-BankG30, Art. 43 BEHG31) and exempts the employees from the 			
25  Each fact that is cumulatively known to a limited circle of persons and not publicly available, in respect of 
which the employer has a legitimate interest in maintaining confidentiality and in respect of which the em-
ployer has a will to maintain confidentiality which is, at least, apparent from the circumstances or probable; 
Ullin Streiff & Adrian von Kaenel & Roger Rudolph, Arbeitsvertrag, Praxiskommentar zu Art. 319–362 OR, 
7. Aufl., Zürich 2012, Rn. 12 zu Art. 321a OR . 
26  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1414 et seq. and 1422. 
27  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1425. 
28  See section. III. D.1. 
29  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1425. 
30  Swiss Federal law on banks and saving banks as of 8 November 1934 (Bundesgesetz vom 8. November 1934 über 
die Banken und Sparkassen, Bankengesetz, BankG) SR 952.0. 
31  Swiss Federal law on stock exchanges and securities trading as of 24 March 1995 (Bundesgesetz vom 24. März 
1995 über die Börsen und den Effektenhandel, Börsengesetz, BEHG) SR 954.1. 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
RITA PIKÓ  |  SWISS LEGAL STATUS ON THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS 
 
PAGE  40 
new regulations (Art. 321asepties CH-Draft-CO). This concerns, next to medical confiden-
tiality, inter alia, attorney-client privilege and banking secrecy. To the extent that no other 
legal justifications apply, professionally privileged persons reporting irregularities can rely 
only on the justifications of safeguarding justified interests.32 In Art. 3 para. (3) the EU 
Whistleblower Protection Directive states that the Directive does not affect the protec-
tion of legal and medical professional privilege. 
 
D. Three-Step Reporting Cascade 
 
The CH-Draft-CO provides for a three-step reporting cascade pursuant to which the 
whistleblower shall report, first, to the employer, then to the competent authority, and 
only in the last step to the public. Provided that employees comply with this cascade and 
its preconditions the report of an irregularity is basically deemed to comply with the fidu-
ciary duty (Art. 321abis 0 CH-Draft-CO). This reporting cascade codifies the rulings of the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court on permitted whistleblowing in Switzerland.33 
 
Also, employees do not violate their fiduciary duty if they obtain advice from a person 
subject to statutory confidentiality regarding their right to report irregularities (Art. 
321asexies CH-Draft-CO). 
 
In detail, the conditions and requirements of each cascade remain complex for employers 
as well as employees in spite of the statutory basis. 
 
1. Report to Employer (1st Cascade) 
 
Employees must generally always report irregularities first to the employer (1st Cascade). 
 
In this respect the CH-Draft-CO provides for a statutory assumption that a report to the 
employer has an effect if the employer creates an independent office for the receipt and 
handling of reports, draws up rules on the subsequent treatment thereof, prohibits ter-
minations and other detriments due to a report, and allows for reports to be made anon-
ymously (Art. 321aquater para. 2 CH-Draft-CO). Therewith, the legislator intends to set an 
incentive for the implementation of whistleblowing systems. If a whistleblowing system 
is introduced, the whistleblower must prove that the reporting procedures are ineffective 
and that a report to the employer would therefore have no impact.34 Thus, in the case of 
an implemented reporting system, a report directly to the competent authority is possible 
only in exceptional circumstances.35 The legislator does not explicitly state, however, that 
the lack of a whistleblowing system authorizes the whistleblower to report directly to the 
authorities. Even if a whistleblowing system is not in place, such reporting, pursuant to 			
32  BGE 6B_1369/2016, E.6. dated 20 July 2017. 
33  BGE 127 III 310 dated 30 March 2001; BGE 4A-2/2008 dated 8 July 2008. 
34  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1417. 
35  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1427. 
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the wording of the draft law, is permitted only if the whistleblower may legitimately ex-
pect that a report (e.g. to the superior) will have no effect. 
 
The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive, too, sets a preference and clarifies that the 
use of internal channels is preferred over external channels in cases where the breach can 
be addressed effectively internally (Art. 7 (2)). 
 
a) Internal Whistleblowing Systems 
 
The employer is left with sufficient freedom in designing its whistleblowing system: Art. 
321abis CH-Draft-CO does not contain – contrary to the regulations pursuant to Art. 
321aquater para. 2 CH-Draft-CO – any specifications on how to design an internal whistle-
blowing system. It must be suitable for the appropriate handling of reports and secure an 
independent handling of the report.36 
 
aa) Permitted Reporting Channels 
 
The CH-Draft-CO differentiates between internal and external persons and offices that 
are authorized to accept a report (Art. 321abis para. 1 letter b. CH-Draft-CO). An author-
ized internal person may be the superior, the management, the board of directors (Verwal-
tungsrat) of a stock corporation,37 or the compliance officer. As an internal office nomi-
nated by the employer and authorized to accept a report, the compliance department or 
the HR department may be considered in particular. Mostly, in Swiss practice, the man-
agement, the compliance department, and the HR department are responsible for accept-
ing reports.38 
 
Alternatively, the employer may delegate these roles and appoint an external representa-
tive. In that respect the employer may rely on its own solution (e.g. appointment of an 
attorney as ombudsperson) or on an industry solution, i.e., a solution offered by a third 
party to a specific business sector. In the latter case, associations for example could create 
an ombudsman’s office for their sector for those members who for cost reasons cannot 
afford their own ombudsperson. This could be a solution, for example, for non-profit 
organizations such as charitable foundations or associations.39 
 
If an employer has implemented a reporting office, the whistleblower is deemed to be 
acting in accordance with his or her fiduciary duty only if he or she delivers the report to 
such a reporting office (Art. 321abis para. 1 letter b. CH-Draft-CO). 
 			
36  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1417. 
37  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1416 and 1422. 
38  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits & Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 43. 
39  Rita Pikó, Compliance bei Non-Profit-Organisationen – Teil 2, Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von gemein-
nützigen Stiftungen und Vereinen in Deutschland und der Schweiz, CB, 263, 264 et seq. (2018). 
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The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive follows the same understanding, pursuant 
to which reporting channels may be operated internally by appointed persons or offices 
or externally by a third party (Art. 8 (5)). 
 
bb) Plausible Suspicion 
 
A further condition for the employee to comply with the fiduciary duty, next to reporting 
to a reporting office determined by the employer, is the existence of a plausible suspicion 
(Art. 321abis para. 1 letter a. CH-Draft-CO). In the new version of the draft law the term 
sufficient suspicion (“hinreichender Verdacht”) was replaced by traceable suspicion (“na-
chvollziehbarer Verdacht”) to achieve a better cohesion between the French- and the Ital-
ian-language versions of the draft law.40 Accordingly, at the time of reporting the whistle-
blower must have had objective reasons to assume an irregularity. 
 
cc) Reporting Channels 
 
A decisive factor in the successful use of whistleblowing systems is positive communica-
tion and information for employees on the available reporting channels. The whistle-
blowing system will be used only if its existence is known of and trusted. It is left to the 
discretion of the employer to decide what channels are permitted for the reporting. Re-
ports may be made through meetings in person, in writing (letter, fax, email), by phone 
or through special reporting channels such as mobile apps, social media, or Internet-based 
whistleblowing systems. In practice, Swiss companies offer three different reporting chan-
nels: email, meetings in person at the responsible office, and reporting by phone. Only 
31% of the companies offer an Internet-based whistleblowing system.41 
 
Pursuant to the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive, reports must be allowed in writ-
ing and/or orally as well as through meetings in person (Art. 9 (2)). 
 
dd) Anonymous Reporting 
 
The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive leaves it to the respective Member State 
whether anonymous reports must be accepted and handled (Art, 6 (2)). The CH-Draft-
CO permits anonymous reports42 and therewith recognizes that anonymous reports may, 
under given circumstances, be the only means by which a whistleblower may report irreg-
ularities without risk.43 Among the large corporations in Switzerland, 73% allow for anon-
ymous reports. The need for such a solution is demonstrated by the fact that 58% of the 			
40  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1422. 
41  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits & Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 36. 
42  Art. 321aquater Para. 2 letter d. CH-Draft-CO. 
43  The additional report mentions the internet-based whistleblowing system of the Swiss Federal Audit Office 
(Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle) as an example (https://www.efk.admin.ch/de/whistleblowing-d.html) as 	
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initial reports received by these corporations do not refer to the identity of the whistle-
blower.44 
 
ee) Abuse of the Whistleblowing System 
 
It is often feared that the implementation of whistleblowing systems – in particular, if 
anonymous reporting is permitted – increase abuse and bolster false accusations.45 No 
statistical evidence, however, supports such a fear: one study shows that only 3% of all 
reports qualify as abusive. On the contrary, anonymous whistleblowers basically report 
in good faith.46 Besides, the anonymous reporting has – contrary to the often-voiced con-
cerns – no influence on the amount of abusive reports.47 
 
The employer should clearly communicate its expectations when implementing a whis-
tleblowing system, similar to the implementation of other compliance measures. Accord-
ingly, a clear signal that the abuse of the whistleblowing system for one’s own purposes 
or even defamation will trigger disciplinary sanctions is recommended. For this reason, 
Art. 23 (2) of the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive states that the Member States 
must provide for effective, appropriate and dissuasive penalties in respect of persons 
where it is established that they knowingly reported false information. In addition, 
measures for compensatory damages resulting from such false reporting must be provided 
for. 
 
b) Duty of Action for Employers 
 
aa) Taking of Adequate Measures 
 
The employer is obliged to follow up on a report, irrespective of whether the employer 
provides for an internal reporting system or not.48 The CH-Draft-CO refers in this re-
spect to the duty to take adequate (genügende) measures to handle the report (Art. 321abis 
para. 2 letter c. CH-Draft-CO). Deliberately, it is not specified what is meant by the term 
“genügend”.49 Whether measures in the specific case are adequate shall be objectively rea-
soned and may not be judged from the subjective point of view of the employer or the 
whistleblower. Criteria for the judgement of the measures taken by the employer are, in 			
well as of the Federal Office of Police (Bundesamtes für Polizei) (https://www.bkms-system.ch/EFK-de 
www.whistleblowing.admin.ch); BBl 2019 1409, 1423. 
44  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits & Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 39/59. 
45  SwissHoldings Sessionsticker (Sommerssession 2019) dated 29 May 2019, 2 (2 Mar. 2020) https://swisshold-
ings.ch/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Ticker-Sommersession-2019.pdf. 
46  Christian Hauser & Lea Stühlinger, Meldestellen für Hinweisgeber: Unternehmen und Politik sind gefordert, 
CB, 447 (2018). 
47  Christian Hauser, Nadine Hergovits & Helene Blumer, Whistleblowing Report 2019, Chur 2019, 10. 
48  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1427. 
49  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1419. 
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particular, the speed and appropriateness of the employer’s reaction in respect of the re-
ported irregularity.50 
 
An example for a sufficient measure for handling a report is an initial, preliminary exam-
ination of the merits, followed by a triage. The office carrying out the examination must 
decide whether the case should be investigated and, in particular, whether the investiga-
tion should be conducted internally or with external support. Corporates should stand-
ardize these processes in an early stage, to be able to conduct, upon receipt of a report, the 
processes in an efficient, speedy and effective way. According to one study, only 50% of 
the questioned corporations actually follow this advice.51 
 
The employer can determine the subsequent measures only after the incident has been 
investigated and resolved. By regularly informing the whistleblower on the status of the 
investigation and how it is being handled, the employer can signal to the whistleblower 
that the report is being taken seriously and is being investigated. This shall strengthen 
trust both in the employer and in the whistleblowing system. 
 
bb) Deadlines for Handling the Report 
 
The CH-Draft-CO imposes duties on the employer to act on a received report. Under the 
draft, the employer must establish an appropriate deadline of no more than 90 days from 
receipt of a report for its handling (Art. 321abis para. 2 letter a CH-Draft-CO). The CH-
Draft-CO thereby aims to address different possibilities: simple and urgent cases that re-
quire a quick response and a correspondingly shorter deadline, and more complex cases 
that may require a longer investigation.52 It seems that the Swiss legislator intended to 
oblige the employer to conclude an investigation of a report on irregularities within no 
more than 90 days. For complex matters, however, practice shows that this deadline can-
not be met. Certain internationally known compliance cases that have been investigated 
internally have taken several years to conclude. A different, more practically orientated 
interpretation of this draft provision would be that the employer is obliged to start inves-
tigation measures within the deadline of 90 days but need not, by law, have concluded 
them within that time. 
 
The employer is obliged to inform the whistleblower on the receipt and the handling of 
the report (Art. 321abis para. 2 letter b. CH-Draft-CO) independently of whether a whis-
tleblowing system has been implemented or not.53 The employer is exempt from this ob-
ligation only if the report is anonymous, which makes the obligation impossible or appar-
ently unreasonable for the employer to fulfil. The CH-Draft-CO does not state at what 			
50  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1424. 
51  Christian Hauser & Lea Stühlinger, Meldestellen für Hinweisgeber: Unternehmen und Politik sind gefordert, 
CB, 446 (2018). 
52  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1424. 
53  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1427. 
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point in time the employer must inform the whistleblower on the handling of a report 
(Art. 321abis para. 2 letter b. CH-Draft-CO). 
 
The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive is more concrete in these aspects: the em-
ployer must confirm receipt of a report within seven days to the whistleblower (Art. 9 (1) 
letter b). Within three months of that confirmation the employer is obliged to inform the 
whistleblower on the subsequent measures taken (Art. 9 (1) letter f). Such subsequent 
measures include actions to assess the accuracy of the allegations made in the report and 
to stop the reported violation (Art. 5 No. 12). 
 
2. Report to Authorities (2nd Cascade) 
 
If an employer does not comply with its statutory duties upon receipt of a report on ir-
regularities (see above section D.1.b.) the whistleblower is entitled to inform the compe-
tent authorities on the irregularities without violating his or her fiduciary duty (Art. 321ater 
CH-Draft-CO). The same applies if, due to his or her report to the employer, the whistle-
blower’s employment contract is terminated or the whistleblower experiences other det-
rimental consequences (Art. 321ater letter b. CH-Draft-CO). 
 
A whistleblower may signal a report directly to an authority, i.e. without a previous report 
to the employer, if there exists plausible suspicion and the whistleblower may assume that 
(i) a report to the employer will have no effect, or (ii) the competent authority would be 
prevented in its duties without an immediate report to it, or (iii) there exists an immediate 
and severe threat to lives, health or the safety of persons or the environment or an imme-
diate danger of great damage. (Art. 321aquater CH-Draft-CO). Whether, in a given situa-
tion, a danger exists or merely threatens is based on the assessment by the whistleblower.54 
 
The authority competent to verify compliance with the violated regulation is the recipient 
of a report on irregularities: the prosecution authorities in the case of criminal acts, and 
the administrative authorities in the case of a violation of public law. The CH-Draft-CO 
specifies that, to be able to report to authorities, the irregularities must concern regula-
tions subject to control by an authority. This basically excludes irregularities in civil law 
that concern, exclusively, a legal relationship between private persons. Irregularities may, 
however, be reported to authorities in spite of their association with civil law where the 
legal relationship is between a private person and an authority and is covered, for example, 
by the law on the protection of adults (Erwachsenenschutzrecht) or company registration 
law.55 
 
Accordingly, additional violations determined by the employer that do not qualify as a 
violation of law verifiable by authorities cannot be reported to an authority. Rather, the 
employee would in such a case probably be in breach of his or her fiduciary duty. Any 			
54  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1428. 
55  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1426. 
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informing of the public in a case that does not breach fiduciary duty is not intended by 
the CH-Draft-CO either, as such a report mandatorily requires, first, a report to the com-
petent authority (Art. 321aquinquies CH-Draft-CO, see below section III.D.3.). 
 
In this context it should be further noted that the regulations apply only to reports to 
domestic and not to foreign authorities.56 A report to a German authority of a criminal 
irregularity by an employee of a Swiss subsidiary of a German company, for example, 
would therefore not be protected by the CH-Draft-CO. 
 
Pursuant to Art. 10 of the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive, employees may report 
to authorities after having made use of internal channels. Alternatively, subject to certain 
conditions, they may report directly to the competent authority. 
 
3. Disclosure to the Public (3rd Cascade) 
 
Pursuant to the CH-Draft-CO, disclosure to the public by a whistleblower is an excep-
tion. The whistleblower that discloses irregularities to the public is deemed to comply 
with his or her fiduciary duty only if (i) the whistleblower reported the irregularity to the 
competent authority and received no appropriate response within 14 days thereafter, or 
(ii) the whistleblower’s employment contract was terminated following the report to the 
authority, or (iii) the whistleblower experienced other detrimental consequences (Art. 
321aquinquies letter c. CH-Draft-CO). A further condition is that the whistleblower has se-
rious reasons to believe – in good faith – that the reported circumstances are true (Art. 
321aquinquies letter a. CH-Draft-CO). By these conditions the legislator increases the hurdle 
compared to the preceding steps of cascades that require only that a whistleblower has a 
plausible suspicion.57 Under Art. 14 CH-StGB, the whistleblower is deemed to be acting 
justly only if all these conditions are met.58 
 
In the final version of the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive the conditions for pro-
tection of a whistleblower if he or she discloses information to the public was redefined 
(Art. 15). Accordingly, a whistleblower must (i) initially report to an internal or external 
reporting channel or directly externally if no appropriate action was taken in response to 
the report within the relevant timeframe, and (ii) the whistleblower has reasonable 
grounds to believe that (iii) the violation may constitute an imminent or manifest danger 
to the public interest or, in the case of external reporting, there is a risk of retaliation or 
there is low prospect of the violation being effectively addressed. 	  
			
56  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1417. 
57  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1417. 
58  Additional Report (Zusatzbotschaft), BBl 2019 1409, 1414. 
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E. Employer’s Duties Regarding the Protection of the Whistleblower 
 
The employer must ensure that the whistleblower incurs no disadvantages when report-
ing in compliance with the above described order of cascade. Further, the whistleblower 
may incur no disadvantages from consulting on the reporting rights with a person subject 
to statutory secrecy obligations (Art. 328 para. 3 CH-Draft-CO). The legislator does not 
define the meaning of disadvantages, nor what protection measures must be implemented 
by the employer, nor what consequences are triggered by a breach of such duties.  
 
The EU Whistleblower Protection Directive explicitly specifies in Art. 19 what actions 
qualify as retaliation and obliges the member states to take measures to prohibit any form 
of retaliation. Such retaliations include, inter alia, suspension, lay-off, demotion or with-
holding of promotion, reduction in wages, negative performance assessment, intimida-
tion, discrimination, harm to the person’s reputation, including the threat and attempt 
of these retaliations. In addition, extensive safeguards are provided: whistleblowers shall 
not incur any liability for breach of contractual or statutory restrictions on disclosure of 
information (Art. 21). Whistleblowers are entitled to fair proceedings and the right to be 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
RITA PIKÓ  |  SWISS LEGAL STATUS ON THE PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS 
 
PAGE  49 
heard, effective remedy and right to access their file (Art. 22). Persons that hinder or try 
to hinder reports, retaliate or breach the duty of maintaining confidentiality duties are 
subject to penalties (Art. 23 (1)). 
 
F. Abusive Lay-Off 
 
Swiss employment law is marked by the principle of freedom to terminate an employ-
ment contract. Employers and employees may ordinarily terminate an unlimited employ-
ment relationship without objective justification, subject to notice periods and termina-
tion dates pursuant to Art. 334 et seq. CO, respectively without notice pursuant to Art. 
337 et seq. CO.  
 
Art. 336 CO provides for an objective protection from termination by an exemplary list-
ing of abusive circumstances. The draft law intends to extend these abusive circumstances 
to include the termination of the employment relationship by the employer due to the 
whistleblower reporting an irregularity in compliance with the cascade or due to the whis-
tleblower taking advice in that respect (Art. 336 para. 2 letter d. CH-Draft-CO). In this 
case the whistleblower may, in accordance with Art. 336b (1) CO, raise an objection with 
the employer against the termination until the end of the period of notice. 
 
The labor law consequences of an abusive termination are laid down in Art. 336a CO, 
respectively Art. 337c CO. In the case of an abusive ordinary termination the whistle-
blower is entitled to compensation of up to the equivalent of six months’ salary. In the 
case of an abusive termination without notice the whistleblower is entitled, pursuant to 
Art. 337c CO, to what he or she would have earned had the employment relationship been 
terminated in compliance with the ordinary notice period. 
 
The termination, however, remains effective. The Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) de-
liberately wishes to go no further.59 The CH-Draft-CO does not provide for grandfather-
ing of the whistleblower or an explicit prohibition of retaliation or even a penalty for abu-
sive termination. Rather, the legislator relies on the deterrent effect of a whistleblower 
informing the public should the whistleblower be laid off or incur other detrimental con-
sequences, and provided that the other conditions are satisfied.60 
			
59  Report of the partial revision of the Swiss Code of Obligations (Botschaft über die Teilrevision des Obliga-
tionenrechts) dated 20 November 2013, BBl 2013 9513, 9515: “An abusive or unjustified notice following a report 
which does not violate the fiduciary duty will continue to be sanctioned in accordance with applicable law. (...) 
An additional protection against notice just for the case of a report of an irregularities cannot be justified com-
pared to other reasons for an abusive notice.” („Eine missbräuchliche oder ungerechtfertigte Kündigung im 
Anschluss an eine Meldung, die nicht gegen die Treuepflicht verstösst, wird weiterhin nach dem geltenden Recht 
sanktioniert. (…) Ein erweiterter Kündigungsschutz nur für den Fall der Meldung einer Unregelmässigkeit lässt 
sich im Vergleich mit anderen Gründen für eine missbräuchliche Kündigung nicht rechtfertigen.“). 
60  It is noteworthy that the whistleblower may notify the public only if the employer gave notice to the whistle-
blower or the whistleblower incurred other detrimental consequences after his or her report to the authorities. 	
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IV. OUTLOOK 
 
Statutory regulation of the conditions for permissible whistleblowing in Switzerland is 
undoubtedly necessary to provide legal certainty for whistleblowers and employers. The 
Legal Affairs Committee of the Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) dismissed the draft 
of the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) on “Whistleblowing”, reasoning that following 
its revision the draft of the Swiss Federal Council (Bundesrat) still remains very complex 
and hard to understand for employees. 61  The Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) 
“neatly” buried the draft law the first time on 3 June 2019, and for the second time and 
definitely on 5 March 2020.62  At the end of the debate of the Swiss National Council 
(Nationalrat) the Swiss Federal Councillor (Bundesrätin), Karin Keller-Sutter stated that 
she cannot promise a different or better submission; in effect, that the Swiss Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) will not be able to take action nor will it be able to present a new 
submission immediately.63  
 
In the end, following a long legislative process, whistleblowers in Switzerland remain 
without statutory protection. Swiss corporations with foreign business must deal with 
foreign rules, i.e. the EU Whistleblower Protection Directive, on their own. Presumably, 
the OECD’s evaluation of Switzerland may not become a positive evaluation in the short 
term. 
			
Pursuant to the draft act, the whistleblower may not lawfully inform the public if (i) the whistleblower fruit-
lessly reported to the employer and the employer thereupon gave notice to the whistleblower (ii) the whistle-
blower thereupon fruitlessly informed the authorities, and the other conditions for the lawful information of 
the public are met. For Art. 321aquinquies letter c. no 2 CH-Draft-CO states that the public may be informed only 
if the whistleblower was given notice after his or her report to the authority – but not before. 
61  On 3 May 2019 the Legal Affairs Committee of the Swiss National Council dismissed the proposal of the Swiss 
Federal Council on “Whistleblowing” by 19 to 4 votes; press release of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Swiss 
National Council dated 3 May 2019, (13 Mar. 2020) https://www.parlament.ch/press-releases/Pages/mm-rk-
n-2019-05-03.aspx. 
62  Swiss National Council in favor of a “neat burial” of the whistleblowing proposal, notice dated 13 May 2020; 
https://www.parlament.ch/de/services/news/Seiten/2019/20190603185414556194158159041_bsd155.aspx. 
63  Speech of Federal Councilor Karin Keller-Sutter, (13 Mar. 2020) https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbe-
trieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=48524#votum12. 
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ABSTRACT 
In some nations, including Sweden and South Korea, cash payments are becoming increas-
ingly uncommon. Other nations, such as Germany, continue to predominantly prefer cash. 
At the same time, digital currency is on the rise, and the announced launch of Facebook’s 
stablecoin Libra, in particular, has caused a debate around digital money. In response, a 
number of central banks have begun to consider launching their own versions of digital 
currency. This article analyzes characteristics of both cash and digital currency and illus-
trates advantages as well as disadvantages of digital money and a cashless society. In partic-
ular, privacy concerns regarding digital cash are addressed. In addition, compliance risks 
are highlighted, and it is deliberated whether the introduction of digital cash could lead to 
a decrease in crime related to cash and cryptocurrencies.
		
FABIAN TEICHMANN & MARIE-CHRISTIN FALKER  |  WILL DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPLACE CASH? –  
DIGITAL CURRENCY, PRIVACY, AND SURVEILLANCE 
 
PAGE  52 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	 INTRODUCTION 53	
II.	 CHARACTERISTICS OF CASH 54	
III.	 CHARACTERISTICS OF DIGITAL CURRENCY 55	
IV.	 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 58	
A.	 Data Protection 58	
1.	 China 58	
2.	 United States 58	
3.	 European Union 59	
4.	 Venezuela 59	
B.	 Cryptocurrencies 60	
V.	 LIBRA 60	
VI.	 CENTRAL BANK-ISSUED DIGITAL CURRENCY 62	
A.	 China 62	
B.	 United States 64	
C.	 European Union 65	
D.	 Venezuela 65	
VII.	 TOWARD A CASHLESS SOCIETY? 66	
A.	 Benefits of a Cashless Society 68	
B.	 Risks of a Cashless Society 68	
C.	 Responses 70	
VIII.	 DISCUSSION 70	
IX.	 CONCLUSION 72	
		
FABIAN TEICHMANN & MARIE-CHRISTIN FALKER  |  WILL DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPLACE CASH? –  
DIGITAL CURRENCY, PRIVACY, AND SURVEILLANCE 
 
PAGE  53 
COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The race for a central bank-issued digital currency has begun. Research conducted by 
cryptocurrency and blockchain research and analysis group The Block analyzed 60+ cen-
tral banks and found that 18 of these banks publicly acknowledged they were developing 
a digital currency. These include the central banks of China, Singapore, Iran, UAE, and 
Europe. Four countries, namely, Tunisia, Senegal, Venezuela, and Uruguay, have already 
launched their versions, whereas the others have launched pilots or are still in develop-
ment1. In particular, the announced launch of Facebook’s Libra cryptocurrency is cur-
rently motivating central banks to come up with digital equivalents of their governmental 
currencies2. China seems to be particularly eager to replace cash with a digital currency3. 
 
At the same time, the public is becoming increasingly aware of government surveillance 
techniques and the resulting lack of privacy. Nations such as China are suspected of taking 
government surveillance to extremes. In China, technologies such as facial recognition are 
being used to monitor citizens in nearly every aspect of their lives, including crossing the 
street (which could result in a jaywalking fine) and purchasing a sim-card for a mobile 
phone (new purchases require users to scan their face). In the context of this extensive 
governmental surveillance, which is mainly performed using new technology, China’s an-
nouncement of the intention to introduce a digital currency has caused a debate on 
whether the Chinese government could attempt to use the currency to monitor its citi-
zens. Because of the possibility of such behavior by governments, many citizens in China 
and elsewhere are likely to be opposed to the introduction of central bank-issued digital 
currencies. After all, recent changes brought about by digitalization, which include data 
brokers’ selling of personal data to advertisers and the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 
where the company used personal data of up to 87 million Facebook users to facilitate 
Donald Trump’s political campaign4, are causing privacy to become an increasingly valu-
able good. Kenneth Rogoff, former International Monetary Fund chief economist, ad-
mits in his book The Curse of Cash, “We need cash for privacy”5. 			
1  S. Zheng, At Least 18 Central Banks are Developing Sovereign Digital Currencies, THE BLOCK (Dec. 26, 2019, 
1:45 PM EST), https://www.theblockcrypto.com/linked/51526/at-least-18-central-banks-are-developing-sov-
ereign-digital-currencies?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2019-12-26. 
2  M. Orcutt, An Elegy For Cash: The Technology We Might Never Replace, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Jan. 
3, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614998/an-elegy-for-cash-the-technology-we-might-never-re-
place/?utm_source=newsletters&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=+the_download.unpaid.engage-
ment. 
3  R. Zhong, China’s Cryptocurrency Plan Has a Powerful Partner: Big Brother, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 
18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/technology/china-cryptocurrency-facebook-libra.html. 
4  Tagesanzeiger, Facebook wegen Cambridge Analytica angeklagt (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.tagesanzei-
ger.ch/ausland/amerika/facebook-wegen-cambridge-analytica-angeklagt/story/31385518 . 
5  Rogoff quoted in J. Pethokoukis, The Problem with Cash: A Q&A with Economist Kenneth Rogoff, AMERI-
CAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.aei.org/economics/the-problem-with-cash-a-qa-
witheconomist-kenneth-rogoff/. 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF CASH 
 
The term “cash” refers to money in the forms of coins and bills. These are bearer instru-
ments, which means that whoever holds them is assumed to be their owner. Cash trans-
actions are peer-to-peer; there is no third party, such as an intermediary, involved and 
ownership can be transferred simply by handing over the cash6. There is not necessarily 
even a record of the transaction. Therefore, cash is considered to be highly anonymous. If 
records are not made, transactions using cash cannot easily be reconstructed. Further, con-
trary to digital payments, cash provides no data that could be used by companies to build 
advertising profiles or credit ratings. Similarly, cash does not facilitate governmental track-
ing of spending and individuals7. Moreover, hardly any trust is required in cash transac-
tions: as long as one can verify its legitimacy, there is no danger of losing the money, as 
would be the case, for instance, if one accepted a check from an insolvent bank8. 
 
Further, cash is permissionless, which means it does not require authorization from an 
institution in order to be used in a transaction. In contrast, people who do not have good 
credit, a government ID, steady income, or a permanent address will have difficulty open-
ing a bank account. Gender discrimination could also be an issue: some countries do not 
allow women to open bank accounts9. With cash, every person can participate in the sys-
tem without first being granted permission10. The permissionlessness of cash also makes 
it resistant to censorship, which means it can be used for illegal or culturally taboo activi-
ties11. As a result, payment by cash is a preferred modus operandi for a wide variety of 
criminals, including drug dealers, arms dealers, and many others.12 
 
Because cash is used in the majority of transactions related to organized crime, money 
laundering (as a necessary consequence of such use) has become a significant threat to 
national economies and is a global problem13. Its effects are felt on a microeconomic scale 
in the private sector, within which money launderers use front companies to mix legiti-
mate and illegitimate income. In some cases, front companies even sell products at prices 
below manufacturing cost, which gives them an advantage over legitimate businesses14. 			
6  J. Brito, The Case for Electronic Cash: Why Private Peer-to-Peer Payments are Essential to an Open Society, 
COIN CENTER (Feb., 2019), https://coincenter.org/files/2019-02/the-case-for-electronic-cash-coin-center.pdf. 
7  Orcutt, supra note 2. 
8  Brito, supra note 6. 
9  M. Coker, How Guardianship Laws Still Control Saudi Women, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/world/middleeast/saudi-women-guardianship.html. 
10  Brito, supra note 6. 
11  Brito, supra note 6. 
12  F. TEICHMANN, UMGEHUNGSMÖGLICHKEITEN DER GELDWÄSCHEREIPRÄVENTIONSMASSNAHMEN [in 
German] 3 (Schulthess) (2016). 
13  J. Harvey, An evaluation of money laundering policies, 8 J MON L CONT 339 (2005). 
14  This could be the case with real estate, see e.g., F. Teichmann, supra note 12 at 155. 
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This can lead to the crowding out of private sector businesses by criminal organizations. 
Ultimately, these organizations’ management principles do not concur with traditional 
free market principles, which leads to negative microeconomic and macroeconomic ef-
fects15. Money laundering laws have been widely established to facilitate the conviction of 
criminals, particularly those involved in the drug trade. However, for a variety of reasons, 
money laundering continues to pose a threat to the public16. 
 
Money launderers frequently operate within networks of cooperation with other crimi-
nals. Therefore, their laundering methods are extremely difficult to substantiate17. When 
working with banks, money launderers utilize front people in order to remain anony-
mous. These front people pose as the beneficial owners of front companies and bank ac-
counts18. Some jurisdictions, such as Dubai, are more cash-intensive than others and so 
tend to be preferred by money launderers19. In addition, the increasing density of compli-
ance and know-your-customer (KYC) regulations in the financial sector has caused many 
money launderers to relocate their activities to less regulated sectors20. These include, 
among many others, the cryptocurrencies sector21. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies at-
tempt to mimic the characteristics of cash; however, they are difficult to use and pro-
cessing a transaction can be a slow process. Additionally, their values often fluctuate22. As 
a result, cash continues to be the most feasible option for individuals who either have no 
access to a bank account or wish to keep their transactions private. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF DIGITAL CURRENCY 
 
“Digital Currency” is a blanket term that includes all forms of electronic money. Thus, 
virtual currencies and cryptocurrencies are (overlapping) types of digital currency. Digital 
currencies can be regulated or unregulated but are always intangible. Digital currencies 
that are spent using electronic wallets or networks are often called digital money. There 
are no intermediaries involved, which means transactions are fast and transaction fees are 
			
15  J. McDowell, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime, HOMELAND SECURITY DIGITAL 
LIBRARY (May, 2001), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=3549. 
16  F.C. Razzano, American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide System of Banking Compli-
ance Programs, 3 J INT L & PRAC 277, (1994). 
17  F. Teichmann & M.C. Falker, Money Laundering – Currency Exchange, J FIN REG COMP (forthcoming). 
18  F. Teichmann & M.C. Falker, Money Laundering Through Banks in Dubai, J FIN REGULATION COMP 
(forthcoming). 
19  F. Teichmann & M.C. Falker, Money Laundering – The Gold Method, J MON L CONT (forthcoming). 
20  Teichmann, supra note 12 at 27. 
21  F. Teichmann & M.C. Falker, Money Laundering Through Cryptocurrencies, in: Artificial Intelligence: An-
thropogenic Nature vs. Social Origin (B.S. Sergi & E.G. Popkova eds, Springer, forthcoming). 
22  Orcutt, supra note 2. 
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low23. Virtual currencies are a subset of digital currencies that are characterized as usually 
controlled by their creators and “accepted among the members of a specific virtual com-
munity”24. Virtual currencies represent a monetary value that is issued, managed, and con-
trolled by private issuers and are used for peer-to-peer transactions. They can be repre-
sented by tokens and are not necessarily backed by legal tender. Owing to their lack of 
regulation, the prices of virtual currencies are rather volatile. Cryptocurrencies such as 
ethereum or Bitcoin are considered virtual currencies25.  
 
Cryptocurrencies are made secure by encryption algorithms and cryptographic tech-
niques. For this reason, they are difficult to counterfeit. They often operate in systems 
that are blockchain-based and decentralized. These characteristics make the role of a 
trusted third party such as a central bank redundant. Instead, users transfer funds peer-
to-peer with the use of private and public keys26. Bitcoin is the most well-known crypto-
currency. Cryptocurrencies share some characteristics with cash; in particular, they are 
highly anonymous. However, unlike cash, they are not completely anonymous, because 
details of every transaction (including users’ public keys, the time, and the date) are rec-
orded irrevocably on the blockchain. Like cash, cryptocurrencies have a reputation for 
being used for criminal activity, primarily owing to the fact that they are not controlled 
by a central entity and governments have very little jurisdiction over them. According to 
Jill Carlson, co-founder of Open Money Initiative, cryptocurrencies were not designed to 
solve mainstream issues such as speed of transactions and stable values; they were created 
to resist censorship. As a result, cryptocurrencies have been documented as being used to 
purchase drugs online, buy US dollars in Argentina, pay sex workers, make international 
monetary transfers, support dissidents in Hong Kong, and move money out of Vene-
zuela27. Carlson furthermore argues: “It is time to face this potentially uncomfortable re-
ality: cryptocurrency is most useful when breaking laws and social constructs”28. In con-
clusion, cryptocurrencies facilitate financial activities that would otherwise be prohibited 
or suppressed. 
 
Like cash, privacy-preserving decentralized technologies have given organizations and 
people the opportunity to escape censorship. Although the actors in these domains act in 
accordance with certain regulations, government policies and social norms can hardly be 
enforced in these contexts. Therefore, stopping censored activities becomes much more 
			
23  Y.B. Perez, The Differences Between Cryptocurrencies, Virtual, and Digital Currencies, THE NEXT WEB (Feb. 
19, 2019, 9:14 UTC), https://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2019/02/19/the-differences-between-cryptocurren-
cies-virtual-and-digital-currencies/. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  J. Carlson, Cryptocurrency is Most Useful for Breaking Laws and Social Constructs, COINDESK (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.coindesk.com/cryptocurrency-is-most-useful-for-breaking-laws-and-social-constructs. 
28  Id. 
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difficult29 . Data collected by blockchain analytics company Chainalysis supports this 
claim: in 2019, $US2.8 billion in Bitcoin were transferred through crypto exchanges by 
criminals30. According to Chainalysis, crypto exchanges have always been “popular off-
ramp for illicit cryptocurrencies”31. In addition, the share of illicit cryptocurrency has 
steadily grown since the beginning of 2019. Within the scope of their analysis, especially 
in relation to crypto exchanges, Binance and Huobi came under scrutiny. Although both 
exchanges have KYC protocols in place, the requirements are less stringent for over-the-
counter (OTC) brokers. As a result, some OTC desks seem to have specialized in provid-
ing money-laundering services to criminals32. 
 
The small amount of quantitative data available also suggests that the use of cryptocur-
rency is more predominant in countries with financial restrictions33. Data on the crypto-
currency trade in Venezuela has shown that, between the petro (the central bank-issued 
digital currency) and decentralized cryptocurrency, citizens seem to prefer the latter. Ex-
perts also claim that in Palestine, where many financial services such as PayPal are not 
available, the awareness of Bitcoin and ethereum has increased since 2018. This is not only 
true for terrorism financiers, but also for irreproachable residents and businesspeople34. 
Thus, it can be assumed that in regions where the public distrusts the government or local 
currency, where hyperinflation is prevalent, or where there are simply no other alterna-
tives available, residents frequently turn to cryptocurrency. Laws are not always consid-
ered acceptable by either citizens of the jurisdiction or by outsiders. Therefore, experts 
argue that it cannot be concluded that privacy-enhancing technologies are used primarily 
for illegal or socially unacceptable activities35. In particular, in societies and nations where 
government surveillance seems ubiquitous, citizens use both cash and cryptocurrencies or 
other privacy-enhancing technologies to protect their privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
			
29  Id. 
30  Chainalysis Team, Money Laundering in Cryptocurrency: How Criminals Moved Billions in 2019, CHAINAL-
YSIS INC (Jan. 15, 2020), https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/money-laundering-cryptocurrency-2019. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  M. Ahlborg, Nuanced Analysis of LocalBitcoins Data Suggests Bitcoin is Working as Satoshi Intended, ME-
DIUM (Feb. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@mattahlborg/nuanced-analysis-of-localbitcoins-data-suggests-
bitcoin-is-working-as-satoshi-intended-d8b04d3ac7b2. 
34  L. Cuen, In Palestine, Civilians Are Using Bitcoin More Than Hamas, COINDESK (Aug. 22, 2019), 
https://www.coindesk.com/palestinian-civilians-are-using-bitcoin-more-than-terrorists. 
35  Carlson, supra note 27. 
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IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A. Data Protection 
 
Data protection is perhaps the most pressing concern of citizens when it comes to digital 
currency or cash. In the following sections, we will present the legal framework for various 
jurisdictions of interest here. 
 
1. China 
 
China has no single comprehensive data protection laws. Instead, there are rules relating 
to data security and personal data protection that are part of a complex framework. These 
rules are incorporated across various regulations and laws. The General Principles of Civil 
Law and the Tort Liability Law have been used to interpret data protection as a right to 
privacy or right to reputation. These interpretations are, however, not explicit36. On June 
1, 2017, the PRC Cybersecurity Law, which addresses data privacy protection and cyber-
security, came into effect. Under this law, the data protection obligations include, among 
others, guidelines on personal information and data security. Current data protection 
rules are based mainly on the Decision on Strengthening Online Information Protection, 
effective from December 28, 2012; the National Standard of Information Security Tech-
nology, a guideline that came into effect on February 1, 2013; and the National Standard 
of Information Security Technology, a Personal Information Security Specification that 
became effective on May 1, 201837. Depending on the industry, provisions contained in 
other laws and regulations might also apply (e.g., for financial institutions, e-commerce 
businesses, and certain healthcare providers). Furthermore, provincial-level laws may 
need to be considered38. 
 
2. United States 
 
In the United States, data security laws are largely sector-specific or medium-specific, and 
include laws and regulations that apply to financial institutions, personal health infor-
mation, telecommunications firms, credit card information telemarketing, direct market-
ing, and children’s information39. Among its 50 states and territories, the United States 
has an abundance of privacy and data security measures that consist of (but are not limited 
to) safeguarding data, privacy policies, disposal of data, and data breach notification. Fur-
ther, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction over many commercial 
entities under its authority in order to safeguard consumers from unfair trade or deceptive 			
36  DLA Piper, Data Protection Laws of the World: China, DLA PIPER (Last modified Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?c=CN&c2=DE&go-button=GO&t=law. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  DLA Piper, Data Protection Laws of the World: USA, DLA PIPER (Last modified Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=US. 
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practices. The FTC issues regulations that enforce privacy laws and investigate firms for 
failing to implement reasonable data protection measures, failing to abide by applicable 
industry self-regulatory principles, and more. In addition, many state attorneys general 
have similar authority over unfair business practices40. 
 
3. European Union 
 
In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation41 (GDPR) entered into 
force in 2016. It became directly applicable in all member states on May 25, 2018 without 
requiring implementation through national law. An EU directive applies consistently 
across all member states and is directly applicable. Over 50 areas are covered by the GDPR; 
however, some are “permitted to legislate differently in their own domestic data protec-
tion laws”42. Any organization that processes personal data of data subjects in the Euro-
pean Union is obligated to abide by GDPR, even if it is not established within the EU. 
This concerns the offering of goods and services43 and the monitoring of the organiza-
tion’s behavior44. In comparison with other regions, the EU regulates data privacy heavily. 
 
4. Venezuela 
 
Venezuela does not have general legislation that regulates data protection; instead, there 
are general principles established in the Constitution and developed by Supreme Court 
decisions45. The framework for personal data protection is based on principles established 
in the Constitution. The purpose of these principles is to safeguard the intimacy, private 
life, self-image, honor, confidentiality, and reputation of citizens. In addition, the Consti-
tution establishes the right to access information and data: based on Article 28 of the Con-
stitution, every person has the right to access information and data concerning themselves 
that is stored in public or private registries. They also have the right to be informed of 
how this information is used, and the right to rectify, update, and destroy incorrect infor-
mation that unlawfully affects their rights. Information on individuals and their pur-
chases may be collected, maintained, and arranged into profiles; this also includes their 
activities. These profiles must be intended for the benefit of the collecting entity or third 
parties, provided all constitutional rights are respected. Collectors of such information 
must also guarantee a number of principles, including the principle of free will, principle 
			
40  Id. 
41  General Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679 (EU). 
42  DLA Piper, Data Protection Laws of the World: Germany, DLA PIPER (Last modified Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?c=CN&c2=DE&go-button=GO&t=law. 
43  General Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679, Art. 3 (2) (a) (EU). 
44  General Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679, Art. 3 (2) (b) (EU). 
45  DLA Piper, Data Protection Laws of the World: Venezuela, DLA PIPER (Last modified Jan. 28, 2019), 
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=VE. 
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of confidentiality, and principle of responsibility. In addition, there is a law against cyber-
crime and the Banking Institutions Law, which regulates data protection in the sector46. 
 
B. Cryptocurrencies 
 
Because digital currency raises so many privacy concerns in relation to the wider public, it 
seems likely that, in the absence of physical cash, citizens will resort to cryptocurrency in 
order to escape constant surveillance. Cryptocurrencies lack regulation in most jurisdic-
tions. Although Liechtenstein’s blockchain act has entered into force on January 1, 2020, 
and EU countries have been obligated to follow the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Di-
rective (AMLD5) since January 10, 2020, regulators of cryptocurrency face a number of 
obstacles. Apart from the AMLD5, there are no common rules for the regulation of vir-
tual currencies. Only “a tiny fraction of Bitcoins or other digital coins”47 are exchanged 
for euros. Therefore, most decision makers have not paid cryptocurrencies much atten-
tion, thus far. Now that Libra has been announced, the EU in particular seems to be in-
creasingly concerned with cryptocurrencies. However, EU regulators have not agreed on 
how to treat virtual currencies, yet. In particular, cryptocurrencies could be defined as 
either payment services, securities, or currencies. However, the option to treat them as 
currencies is ruled out by most48. Furthermore, it has not been agreed upon whether ex-
isting rules of governing financial instruments could apply to virtual currencies. There-
fore, users of virtual currencies largely operate in a legal gray area in the EU. Other juris-
dictions frequently (such as Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, and Bolivia) either ban cryptocur-
rency entirely, or restrict them (such as China, Morocco, and Ecuador)49. However, data 
collected by the crypto trading platform LocalBitcoins show that in China, India, and 
Saudi Arabia, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin continue to be traded despite bans and 
restrictions50. 
V. LIBRA 
 
As previously mentioned, the introduction of Facebook’s stablecoin Libra has motivated 
multiple governments and central banks to research options for their own digital cur-
rency. At the beginning of 2019, experts were still skeptical about state-backed digital cur-
rencies. The general manager of the Bank of International Settlements, Augustín Car-
stens, showed little enthusiasm: “Research and experimentation have so far failed to put 			
46  Id. 
47  Guarascio, UPDATE 1-EU Finance Commissioner Pledges to Regulate Digital Currencies (Oct. 8. 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/reuters-america-update-1-eu-finance-commissioner-pledges-to-regulate-
digital-currencies.html. 
48  Id. 
49  Cryptonews, Countries Where Bitcoin is Banned or Legal in 2020 (n.d.), https://cryp-
tonews.com/guides/countries-in-which-bitcoin-is-banned-or-legal.htm. 
50  Coin.Dance, LocalBitcoins Volume Charts, COIN DANCE (Updated Weekly), https://coin.dance/volume/lo-
calbitcoins. 
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forward a convincing case […] Central banks are not seeing today the value of venturing 
into uncharted territory”51. In July, Carstens corrected his March statement and said that 
central bank digital currencies may be closer to being implemented than initially expected. 
This change of heart occurred after Facebook revealed its plans for Libra in June52. 
 
The Libra association is located in Geneva, Switzerland, and consists of renowned firms 
such as Spotify, Lyft, Vodafone, and Coinbase. Unlike other cryptocurrencies, Libra is a 
stablecoin, which means that its value is backed by a reserve of assets. In addition, Libra is 
centralized, which means that, unlike Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, Libra nodes 
(computers that verify transactions and validate the network) are controlled exclusively 
by the Libra Association. The fact that Libra is controlled by private companies is being 
criticized harshly by international experts, especially in Europe, for instance by Yves 
Mersch, head of the European Central Bank53. In line with Germany, France and the 
United States have also uttered their concerns. Further, Facebook’s multiple data protec-
tion breaches and scandals have elicited skepticism regarding Libra, from not only a large 
proportion of Facebook users but also central bank officials. As a result from the extensive 
international criticism, some members of the Libra Association, including PayPal, Visa, 
and Mastercard, have withdrawn their support for the stablecoin.54 
 
Apart from data protection concerns, regulators are worried that Libra will interfere with 
monetary policy, which is a core government function55. German Finance Minister Olaf 
Scholz argued that the issuance of a currency is a core element of state sovereignty that 
must not fall into the hands of private companies56. Facebook is not the only company 
attempting to venture into finance; corporations such as Google and Apple are also en-
tering the field: Apple has created a credit card, and Google provides an electronic wallet 
and has announced plans for checking accounts for users of their wallet. The wallet in 
one’s phone can be used to make, for instance, payments in stores57. Thus, tech firms are 
offering services that have traditionally been associated with banks. However, when 			
51  A. Carstens, The Future of Money and Payments, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (MAR. 22, 
2019), https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp190322.pdf. 
52  M. Orcutt, Facebook’s Digital Currency May Force Central Banks to Create Their Own, MIT TECHNOLOGY 
REVIEW (July 1, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/f/613909/facebooks-digital-currency-may-force-
central-banks-to-create-their-own/. 
53  Y. Mersch, Money and Private Currencies: Reflections on Libra, European Central Bank (Sept. 2, 2019), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp190902~aedded9219.en.html. 
54  R. Brandom, Facebook's Libra Association crumbling as Visa, Mastercard, Stripe, and others exit. THE 
VERGE (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/11/20910330/mastercard-stripe-ebay-facebook-li-
bra-association-withdrawal-cryptocurrency. 
55  Colitt & Marsh, Facebook’s Obstacles in Europe Mount as Germany Opposes Libra (Sep. 18,2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-18/germany-broadens-european-front-opposing-face-
book-s-libra-plan. 
56  Id. 
57  Wall Street Journal, Why big tech is getting into finance, YOUTUBE (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KFpUZT7go4. 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |    VOLUME 6   NUMBER 1   2020 
FABIAN TEICHMANN & MARIE-CHRISTIN FALKER  |  WILL DIGITAL CURRENCIES REPLACE CASH? –  
DIGITAL CURRENCY, PRIVACY, AND SURVEILLANCE 
 
PAGE  62 
Google or Apple process payments for their clients, they gather vast amounts of data, in-
cluding the date and time of the payment, the vendor, and the amount transferred. This 
information is valuable for advertisers. The associated companies all began by offering 
one service or product, and then gradually widened their range and experienced rapid 
growth at the same time. In response, several United States’ regulatory bodies have initi-
ated antitrust investigations into Google, Facebook, Apple, and other companies. Fur-
ther, the public seems to be distrustful, especially of Facebook58. 
 
The main question regarding Libra is whether private companies should be trusted with 
one’s money. Private stablecoin providers have the potential to unseat banks. Banks, how-
ever, are subject to strict compliance requirements and consumer protection rules. Tech 
giants, on the other hand, could use their networks to monetize information, according 
to economists Adrian and Mancini-Griffoli of the IMF59. They also argue that stablecoin 
users risk losing their assets, and that stablecoins could undermine financial stability. Cen-
tral banks, such as the ones in Singapore and China have, in response to Libra, begun to 
work on their own equivalents, which will be discussed in the following sections. 
VI. CENTRAL BANK-ISSUED DIGITAL CURRENCY 
 
A. China 
 
The initiative for a Chinese digital currency was commenced in 2014. However, the an-
nouncement of the planned launch of Libra seems to have accelerated the process. Ac-
cording to Mu Chanchun, the head of the PBOC digital currency research institute, Libra 
could be accepted by everyone and therefore widely used as a payment tool. His fear is 
that it will “develop into a global, super-sovereign currency”60. In response, he argued in 
an online lecture, China would need to protect its monetary sovereignty61. According to 
Chinese officials, their aim is for the Chinese currency, the renminbi, to be used more in 
international finance and trade. During a speech he gave in July 2019, former central bank 
governor Zhou claimed that “the dominance of the dollar had eroded the economies of 
nations with ‘weak’ currencies”, and warned that Libra could lead to similar outcomes62. 
 
Under the initiative for a Chinese digital currency, the plan is to distribute the digital 
money first to commercial banks. Thereafter, users and businesses will be able to register 
			
58  Id. 
59  T. Adrian & T. Mancini-Griffoli, Digital Currencies: The Rise of Stablecoins, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND (Sept. 19, 2019), https://blogs.imf.org/2019/09/19/digital-currencies-the-rise-of-stablecoins/. 
60  Chanchun quoted in Zhong, supra note 3. 
61  Zhong, supra note 3. 
62  Zhong, supra note 3. 
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wallets with these commercial banks, according to the PBOC63. The pilot digital currency 
will reportedly be tested in the cities Shenzen and Suzhou. For this purpose, the PBOC 
has partnered with several state-owned commercial banks and telecoms64. In the Chinese 
province Anhui, the government has also announced that it will “adopt blockchain tech-
nology across governmental service centers”65. This includes all levels of government in 
Anhui, which will be using blockchain, artificial intelligence, and other new technologies 
to offer governmental services at all times. The stated intention is to “digitize Anhui’s 
governance infrastructure and streamline the collection and sharing of government data 
and resources”. In December 2019, the Chinese central government had published a 
guideline for the Yangtze River Delta Economy Region, which Anhui is part of, to prior-
itize the development of artificial intelligence, blockchain, cloud computing, and other 
emerging technologies66. 
 
Concerns 
 
According to economist Gary Liu, the Chinese digital currency will be “highly controlled, 
manageable, and decided by the central government”67, and thus diverge from the original 
concept of cybersecurity. According to a senior bank official, the Chinese digital currency 
will not seek to “gain full control of information belonging to the general public”; instead, 
the PBOC claims the goal is to balance the authorities’ need for information and privacy 
concerns68. China has suggested that it will not provide marketers with spending infor-
mation; authorities, however, will have access69.  
Users are already required to authenticate their names and identities with the banks and 
electronic payment companies that will distribute the digital currency. Further, the cen-
tral bank will be able to view transaction data70. Experts claim that in contrast to Bitcoin 
			
63  C. Wan, Report: China’s Central Bank to Test Digital Currency in Two Cities, Partnering with State-Backed 
Commercial Banks and Telecom Giants, THE BLOCK (Dec. 9, 2019, 12:35 AM EST), https://www.theblock-
crypto.com/post/49659/report-chinas-central-bank-to-test-digital-currency-in-two-cities-partnering-with-
state-backed-commercial-banks-and-telecom-giants. 
64  Y. Katri, China’s Digital Currency “Progressing Smoothly,” Says Central Bank, THE BLOCK (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.theblockcrypto.com/linked/52092/chinas-digital-currency-progressing-smoothly-says-central-
bank?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-01-12. 
65  Y. Cheng, Chinese Local Government Eyes Adoption of Blockchain for Service Centers, THE BLOCK (Jan. 8, 
2020), https://www.theblockcrypto.com/linked/52200/chinese-local-government-eyes-adoption-of-block-
chain-for-service-centers?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2020-01-08. 
66  Id. 
67  Liu quoted in Zhong, supra note 3. 
68  A. John & K. Coghill, China’s Digital Currency Not Seeking “Full Control” of Individuals’ Details: Central 
Bank Official, REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-markets-digital-cur-
rency/chinas-digital-currency-not-seeking-full-control-of-individuals-details-central-bank-official-
idUSKBN1XM0H2. 
69  Zhong, supra note 3. 
70  Zhong, supra note 3. 
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and Libra, the currency seems to have been designed to provide Beijing “with unprece-
dented oversight over money flows, giving Chinese authorities a degree of control over 
their economy that most central banks do not have”71. During a conference in Singapore, 
Mu Changchun assured the public that users of the digital currency will continue to have 
privacy in their transactions. At the same time, he claimed that the PBOC will find a bal-
ance between “controllable anonymity” and anti-money laundering (AML), counter ter-
rorist financing (CFT), tax issues, online gambling, and any other electronic criminal ac-
tivities72.  
 
Changchun’s statements are questionable: “controlled anonymity” seems a paradox in it-
self. After all, the government or law enforcement agencies will need to sort through all 
user information in order to be able to identify AML or CFT breaches. Flex Yang, the 
founder of a Hong Kong-based financial provider of cryptocurrencies, Babel Finance, ar-
gues that “currencies should be neutral”; without anonymity, he argues, the money can-
not be considered a currency, “it can only be a payment vehicle”73. However, China could 
agree not to save user data, as long as the person in question has not broken the law. Critics 
of the new digital currency also argue that China’s persecuted minorities will “face even 
harsher conditions under a fully integrated financial system controlled by the govern-
ment”74. In an interview with Coindesk, an anonymous Chinese bitcoiner stated that a 
totalitarian state could use blockchain to track every person and their actions, and to en-
force strict currency controls. They go on to talk about how their parents (Christian mis-
sionaries) have been subject to constant surveillance by the Chinese government. They 
claim that, once, their WePay and AliPay accounts were frozen. If they had not had cash, 
they would have been left with no money75. These statements raise concerns that the com-
plete digitalization of money would leave political opponents and minorities vulnerable 
to the repercussions of censorship. 
 
B. United States 
 
In the United States, lawmakers have asked the Federal Reserve to consider the creation 
of a digital dollar. On September 30, 2019, Rep. French Hill and Rep. Bill Foster sent a 
letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell in which they expressed their concerns 
regarding risks to the US dollar if another nation or private company were to create a 
widely employed cryptocurrency. In particular, they emphasized their concern that the 
primacy of the US dollar could be in jeopardy in case of a wide adoption of digital fiat 
			
71  John & Coghill, supra note 68. 
72  John & Coghill, supra note 68. 
73  Yang quoted in Zhong, supra note 3. 
74  L. Cuen, Bitcoin Dissident Sees Dark Warnings in China’s Blockchain Push, COINDESK (Oct. 31, 2019, 10:20 
AM UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-dissident-sees-dark-warnings-in-chinas-blockchain-push. 
75  Id. 
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currencies76. Their letter also specifically mentioned Libra. On October 24, 2019, the Fed-
eral Reserve stated that it is planning to respond to the letter. Former Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Chair Sheila Bair also suggested that the Federal Reserve should 
explore the option of creating a digital currency in order to avoid being disrupted by the 
private sector or other nations77. 
 
C. European Union 
 
In September 2019, Germany and France responded to the announced launch of Libra by 
claiming that the stablecoin “posed risks to the financial sector that could block its au-
thorization in Europe”78. Both countries support the development of an alternative pub-
lic cryptocurrency. French finance minister Bruno Le Maire and German finance minister 
Olaf Scholz released a joint statement at a meeting of euro zone finance ministers in Hel-
sinki, in which they argued that virtual currencies pose risks to financial stability, consum-
ers, and monetary sovereignty79. According to European Central Bank (ECB) board mem-
ber Benoît Cœure, Libra constituted a “wake-up call”80. Accordingly, Libra has motivated 
new efforts to launch an ECB-backed project, TIPS, in the euro zone. Banks, however, 
have responded to this project with apprehension. The ECB seems to also be planning a 
central bank-issued digital currency. According to Cœure, consumers would be able to 
use electronic cash, which would be directly deposited at the ECB. Thus, there would be 
no need for bank accounts, clearing counterparties, or financial intermediaries. As a con-
sequence, transaction costs would decrease. In light of these ambitions, opposition from 
banks is likely. At the same time, the technical feasibility “remains to be seen”81. In No-
vember 2019, Cœure told a conference in Brussels that “a central bank digital currency 
could ensure that citizens remain able to use central bank money, even if cash is eventually 
no longer used”82. 
 
D. Venezuela 
 
In 2018, Venezuela, which is plagued by hyperinflation, launched its cryptocurrency called 
petro. Critics claim that it represents an attempt to collect dollars and open up foreign 
business channels. The price of petro is based on the oil price; one petro is supposed to 			
76  F. Hill & B. Foster, Letter to Jerome H. Powell, COINDESK (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/Foster-Hill-US-Crypto.pdf. 
77  N. De, US Lawmakers Ask Fed to Consider Developing a “National Digital Currency”, COINDESK (Oct. 2, 
2019, 23:08 UCT), https://www.coindesk.com/us-congressmen-ask-fed-to-consider-developing-national-dig-
ital-currency. 
78  Guarascio, supra note 47. 
79  Guarascio, supra note 47. 
80  Cœure quoted in Guarascio, supra note 47. 
81  Guarascio, supra note 47. 
82  B. Cœure, Towards the Retail Payments of Tomorrow: A European Strategy, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
(Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2019/html/ecb.sp191126~5230672c11.en.html. 
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cost as much as one oil barrel, which is about $US6083. Petro is also backed by Venezuela’s 
oil reserves84. Although petro is claimed to be a cryptocurrency, it is supervised and con-
trolled by the federal authority for the supervision and control of cryptocurrencies, which 
conflicts with the fact that cryptocurrencies are generally decentralized and transparent85. 
It had been expected that Venezuelans would not have much interest in buying petro, 
because of the high rates of poverty or lack of access to US dollars. Therefore, it has been 
argued that petro is mainly a vehicle that allows corrupt officials, politicians, and compa-
nies to transfer their assets out of the country. It is also argued that there is no real incen-
tive for investors to buy petro, as three dozen regime members have been sanctioned by 
the US86. Other sources state that petro was launched to circumvent these sanctions and 
overcome liquidity shortages87. 
 
Thus far, petro has been unsuccessful in winning over investors: the currency has, in fact, 
been banned by the United States. Risk-ranking bodies have also labeled it a “scam”88. 
Although petro has failed, other cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin see an increase in their 
trade89 (See e.g., Coin.Dance, 2020). Many Venezuelans keep physical dollar bills to retain 
their assets, which makes them vulnerable to burglary90. Therefore, Venezuelans have re-
sorted to cryptocurrency. There is even a popular local trade, LocalBitcoins, that facili-
tates exchanges between Bitcoin and bolivars, the national currency91. In an effort to re-
vive petro, the Venezuelan president, Nicolas Maduro, has decreed that all airlines flying 
from Caracas must purchase their fuel using petro and that the currency is to be used to 
pay for state document services such as passports92. When Maduro approved bonuses for 
public employees and pensioners in December 2019, these were also paid out in petros. 
However, the petros were quickly exchanged for bolivars, and then for other currencies. 
At the beginning of 2020, the government blocked the exchange of bolivars for petros93. 
VII. TOWARD A CASHLESS SOCIETY? 
 			
83  A. Busch, Venezuelas Kryptowährung Petro ist ein Verzweifelter Versuch an Ausländische Gelder zu Kommen 
[in German], NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG AG (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/potemkinscher-
petro-ld.1359430. 
84  France24, Maduro Bids to Revive Venezuela’s ‘Petro’ Cryptocurrency, FRANCE24 (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.france24.com/en/20200114-maduro-bids-to-revive-venezuela-s-petro-cryptocurrency. 
85  Busch, supra note 83. 
86  Busch, supra note 83. 
87  France24, supra note 84. 
88  France24, supra note 84. 
89  For example, see Coin.Dance, supra note 50. 
90  Orcutt, supra note 2. 
91  Orcutt, supra note 2. 
92  France24, supra note 84. 
93  France24, supra note 84. 
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According to experts, digital money has the potential to replace cash altogether. Sweden 
is one example of an almost cashless society. According to the Swedish central bank, the 
number of payments made using cash is expected to drop to 0.5% by 202094. Further, 
South Korea intends to phase out cash in 202095. Even in the UK, where cash continues 
to be rather popular, bus fares can no longer be paid in cash96. Many citizens in compara-
tively cashless societies utilize mobile payment systems provided by banks and fintechs 
(e.g., Apple Pay or Chinese providers AliPay and WeChat Pay) or credit cards. Naturally, 
these companies have an interest in promoting a cashless society because they collect trans-
action fees from their customers97. Some financial service providers, including Visa, have 
launched advertisements and media campaigns to convince customers to give up cash for 
card payments98. Central banks have an interest in a cashless society, as well, as they would 
be able to “grow the monetary policy tools at their disposal” and “impose negative interest 
rates across the whole economy”99. Further, economist Joseph Stiglitz argued that cash 
should be abolished in order to hinder financial corruption and tax evasion100. 
 
Online, the use of cash has never been possible. Because of the fact that commerce is in-
creasingly relocating to the internet, “the proportion of intermediated payments grows 
concomitantly”101. As online retail is becoming more popular, intermediaries will inevita-
bly have better access to information about buying habits102. However, as shown by Bech 
et al.,103 on a global scale, the demand for cash has not decreased. A report by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) found that cash demand, which is measured by proxy 
through cash in circulation, has increased among the majority of the 46 national econo-
mies in its sample. In addition, out of 24 nations investigated, only Sweden and Russia 
were shown to exhibit signs of substituting cash payments with card payments. The re-
maining 22 countries showed an increase in both cash demand and online payments with 
			
94  J. Henley, Sweden Leads the Race to Become Cashless Society, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2016, 16:00 BST), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/04/sweden-cashless-society-cards-phone-apps-leading-eu-
rope. 
95  P. Jenkins, “We Don’t Take Cash”: Is This the Future of Money?, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/9fc55dda-5316-11e8-b24e-cad6aa67e23e. 
96  Transport for London, Cash Free Buses, TRANSPORT FOR LONDON (no date), 
https://tfl.gov.uk/modes/buses/cash-free-buses. 
97  B. Scott, The War on Cash, NESTA (Aug. 19, 2016), https://thelongandshort.org/society/war-on-cash. 
98  P. Jenkins, supra note 95. 
99  Brito, supra note 6. 
100  R. Chainey, The US Should Get Rid of Cash and Move to a Digital Currency, Says Nobel Laureate Economist, 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/the-us-should-get-
rid-of-cash-and-become-a-digital-economy-says-this-nobel-laureate-economist/. 
101  Brito, supra note 6. 
102  Brito, supra note 6. 
103  M.L. Bech et al., Payments are A-changin’ but Cash Still Rules, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 
(Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803g.htm. 
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the use of cards, which suggests that the unique features of cash are valued104. 
 
A. Benefits of a Cashless Society 
 
In The Curse of Cash, economist Kenneth Rogoff argues that cash is “making us poorer 
and less safe”. In line with Bech et al., Rogoff shows that even though cash is being used 
less frequently, the amount of cash in circulation is actually growing. According to him, 
this cash is being used for tax evasion, terrorism, corruption, human trafficking, the drug 
trade, and a “massive global underground economy”. This could also affect monetary pol-
icy, according to Rogoff. After the 2008 global financial crisis, central banks were not able 
“to stimulate growth and inflation by cutting interest rates significantly below zero for 
fear that it would drive investors to abandon treasury bills and stockpile cash”105. 
 
Compliance officers around the world will likely agree with Rogoff in that cash represents 
an immense risk factor for all sorts of crime. From a compliance perspective, cash poses 
tremendous threats to public safety as it is highly anonymous and non-transparent, which 
makes it well suited to crime and money laundering or terrorism financing. Corruption, 
particularly bribery, is another concern relating to cash. With money laundering, cash 
would be generated during a predicate offense. A drug dealer in Zurich, for instance, will 
accept cash from their clients, with no paper trail or digital record of the transaction. The 
same is true for bribery and terrorism financing. 
 
Although financial institutions and banks are subject to strict compliance measures, cash-
intensive businesses are frequently excluded from these measures. Therefore, money 
launderers and terrorism financiers are increasingly relocating to less-regulated sectors. 
Our 2016 quantitative study showed that, out of the 153 responding compliance experts, 
74.5% agreed that money launderers are relocating to less-regulated sectors106. Therefore, 
it can be assumed that, in a cashless society, it would be much more difficult for criminals 
to continue their illicit activities without being detected. After all, every digital transaction 
would be traceable, which in itself could serve as a deterrent for criminals. In addition, 
they would need to find new methods to be able conduct untraceable transactions. 
 
B. Risks of a Cashless Society 
 
According to Scott A. Shay107, chairman of Signature Bank, the US government fre-
quently seizes money from its citizens before conducting an investigation, even if govern-
ment staff members have no proof of wrongdoing. When a person’s or company’s assets 
are seized, the defendant frequently has no other option than to settle. In one instance, 			
104  Id. 
105  K. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH 1 (Princeton University Press) (2016). 
106  Teichmann, supra note 12, at 85. 
107  S.A. Shay, Cashless Society: A Huge Threat To Our Freedom, CNBC LLC (Dec. 12, 2013), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2013/12/12/cashless-society-a-huge-threat-to-our-freedomcommentary.html. 
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which was argued before the Supreme Court, the government had seized all the money of 
a small family-owned grocery store because its cash deposits were below the $US10,000 
threshold, which triggered a report to the government. As a result, the defendants were 
deprived of money they needed to defend themselves. In such cases, defendants often are 
under pressure to settle or plead guilty108 owing to the fact that they have no access to their 
financial assets. However, they can use cash to finance their daily life, so that they do not 
go hungry. In a cashless society, the freezing of a family’s financial assets could accordingly 
have fatal consequences.  
 
Algorithms that instantaneously review and evaluate financial transactions are available, 
and in use by credit and debit card firms. The technology is typically used to issue fraud 
alerts following unusual consumer purchases. In 2010, Mastercard and Visa banned 
online-betting payments in response to pressure from the US government. Thus, gam-
bling sites struggled to continue operating, regardless of their location or legality. At pre-
sent, these restrictive mechanisms can be circumvented through the use of cash. In a cash-
less society, however, the government would have “unprecedented access to information 
and power over citizens”, according to Shay109.  
 
In addition, it has become easier for governments to gather information. JP Morgan is 
one of the largest US banks; its size is that of 3,000 smaller banks combined, and the top 
four US banks have control over circa 60% of US banking deposits. Thus, there are fewer 
access points for the government. There are compliance hurdles in place for banks that 
wish to deal with certain customers, which make business relations with them expensive. 
In response, some banks, including JP Morgan, refrain from dealing with these clients 
altogether. In this manner, the government can prevent certain individuals or companies 
from accessing the financial system110. Therefore, it could be argued that a cashless society 
could lead to extensive governmental control over human behavior.  
 
Shay calls this phenomenon, which he describes as economic singularity, “econgularity”. 
He defines econgularity as the moment in time when technological surveillance, big data 
manipulation, and a cashless economy converge111. In light of the data presented in section 
4.0, this scenario could potentially be approaching faster than expected. With econgular-
ity, Shay argues that it would be possible for government staff members to order the freez-
ing of funds or decline withdrawals or payments for individuals who are suspected of mis-
conduct or those are political opposers. Before the person is able to access their funds 
again, their case might need to be reviewed, which would take time. In the meantime, the 
individual “might starve to death”. In addition, anyone suspected of helping the person 
could be cut off from accessing their assets, as well112. Naturally, a cashless society will not 			
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
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take this form in all jurisdictions; however, some governments could take the opportunity 
to exert greater control over their citizens. According to crypto expert Jerry Brito, the 
death of cash will inevitably cause “the birth of perfect financial control”113. 
 
C. Responses 
 
In the United States, citizens have begun to argue that cashless businesses violate their civil 
rights. Cities such as San Francisco, Washington D.C., and Philadelphia have therefore 
ruled these businesses out. In New York City, legislation that prevents retail establish-
ments from refusing to accept cash payments was introduced in February 2019114. In Au-
gust, the law was rescinded, but reintroduced in December 2019 (The New York City 
Council, n.d.). As of January 2020, the New York Council has voted to ban cashless stores 
and restaurants115, which means cashless businesses could face fines of up to $US500 per 
violation. In addition to the fear of governmental surveillance and censoring of payments, 
some opponents have also argued that cashless businesses discriminate against low-in-
come people, who are often undocumented immigrants or people of color116. In New 
York City, 25% of underbanked citizens and 12% of unbanked citizens are people of color, 
whereas only 3% of white New Yorkers are unbanked117. This raised the question of 
whether cashless businesses are a manifestation of racial discrimination. This could also 
be problematic for every other demographic that does not have access to a bank account 
(e.g., homeless or unemployed persons). Businesses that operate cash-free argue that a ban 
of cash payments increases efficiency, saves money and time by cutting out the need for 
armored vehicles for transportation, and protects their employees against robbery118. 
VIII. DISCUSSION 
 
Ultimately, an abandonment of cash could facilitate more effective crime prevention and 
prosecution. However, we suggest that replacing cash with a digital form is rather unnec-
essary: the development of digital cash requires an abundance of resources, including 
time, money, human resources, and materials. In addition, once established, the technol-
ogy will need to be maintained, which will require further resources. If the intention is to 
create digital currency with the same characteristics and anonymity as physical cash, there 			
113  Brito, supra note 5. 
114  R. Bellan, As More Cities Ban Cashless Businesses, New York Wants to Follow (Mar 6, 2019), https://www.cit-
ylab.com/equity/2019/03/cashless-cash-free-ban-bill-new-york-retail-discrimination/584203/. 
115  C. Jones, New York Says Don’t Ditch Your Cash: City is Latest to Ban Cashless Restaurants, Stores (Jan. 24, 
2020), https://eu.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/01/23/new-york-city-bans-cashless-busi-
nesses/4551974002/. 
116  Bellan, supra note 114. 
117  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households – 
Executive Summary, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (Oct., 2018), 
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017execsumm.pdf. 
118  Bellan, supra note 114. 
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is no use in replacing physical cash in the first place. Cryptocurrencies, on the other hand, 
are useful primarily for criminals, as they do not require the transacting parties to meet at 
one location. Thus, they facilitate discreet payments without personal contact. When it 
comes to blockchain, the technology shows great potential in the area of smart contracts. 
These could enable legal transactions; in particular, trading with rights and securities 
could be simplified.  
 
Although at present a cashless society is not yet in sight, an increasing number of pay-
ments are conducted via credit or debit card. Statistics relating to credit card and cash 
spending are indicators of consumer spending habits, which could also be used to analyze 
the broader economy as a whole119. A 2017 study conducted by global payments company 
TSYS, which investigated consumer payment, has shown that, currently, debit cards are 
the most popular payment method. In particular, out of 1,222 consumers, 54% chose debit 
cards as their preferred form of payment, while 26% selected credit cards, and 14% stated 
that they preferred cash. It was also shown that consumers are becoming increasingly in-
terested in mobile wallets120. In 2016, global analytics and advice firm Gallup found that 
Americans are using increasingly less cash – in 2011, 36% of analyzed Americans reported 
that they made almost all purchases using cash; in comparison, this number had shrunk 
to 24% in 2016121. These findings are consistent with a multitude of other surveys. There 
are, however, nations that diverge from this trend: Germany is the most prominent ex-
ample of a country where residents continue to prefer cash over credit or debit card pay-
ments, mainly for privacy reasons122. 
 
In light of these findings, financial service providers will see themselves presented with 
increasingly high compliance requirements. With regard to data protection compliance, 
it is of immense importance that customer data is handled responsibly. This includes ac-
curate encryption and theft-prevention measures. At the same time, customers must be 
made aware of how their data is used and who has access to it. Herein, it should be ensured 
that customers have the option to opt out of providing their data for certain purposes 
such as advertisement. A study by researchers from MIT, UCL, and Aarhus University 
has recently shown that out of 10,000 websites, only 11.8% meet minimal requirements of 
the GDPR. In particular, many websites make it difficult for users to opt out of tracking. 
Pop-up windows for cookie consent are often designed so that rejecting tracking is much 
more difficult than consenting to it – in most cases, there is an option to “accept all” but 
none to “reject all”. In addition, 32.5% of the surveyed websites bypass EU law via implicit 
consent, which assumes that failure to respond to a pop-up window or the visiting of the 			
119  M. Shepherd, 19 Cash vs Credit Card Spending Statistics, FUNDERA INC (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.fun-
dera.com/resources/cash-vs-credit-card-spending-statistics. 
120  TSYS, Consumer Payment Study, 7, 38, TOTAL SYSTEM SERVICES INC (Mar., 2018), 
https://www.tsys.com/Assets/TSYS/downloads/rs_2017-us-consumer-payment-study.pdf. 
121  A. Swift & S. Ander, Americans Using Cash Less Compared With Five Years Ago, GALLUP (July 12, 2016), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/193649/americans-using-cash-less-compared-five-years-ago.aspx. 
122  M. Campbell, Germany is Still Obsessed with Cash, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/features/2018-02-06/germany-is-still-obsessed-with-cash. 
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site alone implies consent123. When handling sensitive customer data, practices such as the 
assumption of implicit consent or potential data breaches could lead to significant repu-
tational damages for the institution if thematized by the media. 
 
In the absence of predefined standards, however, financial institutions will also face a 
number of unresolved questions. In order to ensure legal security and prevent compliance 
scandals, these questions must be addressed urgently, so that institutions do not operate 
in dangerous legal gray areas. On January 1, 2020, Liechtenstein’s new blockchain act (Ger-
man: Token- und VT-Dienstleister Gesetz, TVTG) entered into force. Liechtenstein is 
one of the first jurisdictions to regulate blockchain and its potential uses, which includes 
financial services. With the introduction of the TVTG, the Due Diligence Act (German: 
Sorgfaltspflichtgesetz, SPG) has been amended so that due diligence requirements include 
service providers for virtual currencies124. Due diligence measures aim to prevent money 
laundering, terrorism financing, and organized crime. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
Although cryptocurrencies, led by Bitcoin, have been around for over ten years now, up 
until recently most central banks and governments seemed to perceive no significant 
threat to traditional money from digital currency. This sentiment has changed drastically 
since the planned launch of Libra was announced by Facebook. Overall, reactions to Li-
bra have been overwhelmingly negative: multiple central bank officials and politicians 
have expressed concerns regarding implications for privacy and monetary policy. In par-
ticular, the experts have argued that money should not be issued by a private company, 
but by a sovereign entity, i.e., a central bank. Central banks are also concerned that Libra 
could become a widely used payment method that is preferred over governmental cur-
rency. In response, multiple central banks have announced that they will begin develop-
ing their own digital currency, or have accelerated their already existing research efforts. 
China will likely be the first nation to issue a digital currency. However, China’s ambitions 
are viewed critically by the public: the country is known to use new technologies for the 
surveillance of its citizens; as a result, opponents fear that the digital currency will be used 
to surveil and control citizens.  
 
In particular, the PBOC seems to intend to replace physical cash with digital cash. Digital 
cash, however, can never be as private as physical cash; accordingly, the public does not 
seem convinced that their data will not be used for purposes other than processing pay-
ments. In addition, digital cash is not censorship-resistant, which means that certain 
groups of people (e.g., minorities or homeless persons) could be prevented from accessing 
the monetary system. These concerns apply to cashless societies in general. However, a 
			
123  M. Nouwens et al., Dark Patterns After the GDPR: Scraping Consent Pop-ups and Demonstrating Their In-
fluence, CORNELL UNIVERSITY (Jan.8, 2020), https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.02479. 
124  Sorgfaltspflichtgesetz (Dec. 11, 2008)[in German], Art. 3 Sec. 1 (f). 
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cashless society would come with the advantage that organized crime would be signifi-
cantly hindered. As a consequence, money laundering would also become a less pressing 
issue. However, in this scenario, it must be ensured that there is an appropriate legal 
framework for financial service providers to operate within, so that data protection and 
compliance breaches can be prevented. Ultimately, only time will tell whether cash will, 
at some point, be replaced by digital currency. Totalitarian governments could use digital 
currency to surveil the public, marginalize political opponents, or even prevent citizens 
from accessing the financial system altogether. Therefore, the creation of an ethical, inter-
nationally valid framework is crucial. The establishment of such a framework would nat-
urally be highly challenging. Therefore, the international community should ensure that 
countries that seek to violate human rights through their use of digital currency are penal-
ized with hard sanctions, and that their citizens are protected from governmental control. 
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financial crisis. The second chapter combines the theme of knowledge and awareness of a product 
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policymakers.  
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concluding that more needs to be done to educate users, regulators and everyone in between for the 
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I. A HISTORY LESSON FROM THE DERIVATIVES MARKET 
 
Cryptocurrencies. Virtual currencies. Digital coins. Studies from ING1 and St Andrews 
University2 reveal that, “while most of us now know something about these terms, many 
of the details are still a little sketchy.” For me, the term cryptocurrency or virtual currency 
is ingrained somewhere in my brain that leads me to conjure up images from the popular 
animated TV show, Rick & Morty. I believe it will provide some insight on how people 
view ‘crypto’ in general. In the show, our titular characters sit down to watch alien televi-
sion through the use of their ‘interdimensional cable’ device and witness the following: 
 
“Plumbuses – Everyone has a Plumbus in their home. First, they take the dinglebop, 
and they smooth it out, with a bunch of Schleem. The Schleem is then repurposed for 
later batches. They take the dinglebop and push it through the Grumbo, where the Fleeb 
is rubbed against it. It is important that the Fleeb is rubbed, because the fleeb has all of 
the fleeb juice. Then a Schlommy shows up and he rubs it and spits on it. They cut the 
fleeb. They are several hizzards in the way. The blamphs rub against the chumbles. 
And the plubus and grumbo are shaved away. That leaves you with a regular old Plum-
bus.”3 
 
Rick, the genius scientist and multidimensional traveler, nods sagely, whilst his oblivious 
grandson Morty, is as perplexed as the audience. Whilst this mock documentary is reveal-
ing the inner machinations of a nonsense object being produced through unintelligible 
steps using unknown ingredients, it leaves us completely in the dark without a frame of 
reference. “Huh,” Rick says, “always wondered how Plumbuses got made.” 
 
In my experience as a journalist and former legal and compliance analyst, people are often 
enticed by financial products that sound ground-breaking. Who doesn’t wish to be the 
first to uncover something special? Being part of a cultural sea-change, being the right side 
of a technological paradigm shift, and generally appearing to have some insider knowledge 
on future trends, are all (understandably) valued in the industry. However, this focus on 
the symbolic value of products rather than their immediate value calls to mind the ‘father 
of postmodernism’, French sociologist and cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard, who once 
wrote: 
 
“Far from the primary status of the object being a pragmatic one which would subse-
quently come to overdetermine a social value of the sign, it is the sign exchange value 			
1  Jessica Exton, Cryptocurrencies: Curiosity and confusion among consumers, ING (Sep. 18, 2019). 
https://think.ing.com/articles/sizing-up-the-money-revolution-crypto-bitcoin-currencies-digital/ 
2  Georgios A. Panos & Tatja Karkkainen, Financial Literacy and Attitudes to Cryptocurrencies, WORKING PA-
PERS IN RESPONSIBLE BANKING & FINANCE, WP Nº 20-002, pg 6 (2020). 
3  Rick & Morty, season 2, episode 8, “Interdimensional Cable 2: Tempting Fate". Directed by Juan Meza-León. 
Written by Dan Guterman, Ryan Ridley and Justin Roiland, aired September 20 2015, on [adult swim]. 
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(valeur d’echange signe) which is fundamental – use value is often no more than a 
practical guarantee (or even a rationalisation, pure and simple) […] An accurate theory 
of objects will not be established upon a theory of needs and their satisfaction, but upon 
a theory of social prestation and signification.” 4 
 
Baudrillard’s intervention into the political economy debate between Marxists and classi-
cal liberal interpretations of value added a sociological dimension. Objects are bought and 
displayed as much for their sign-value, i.e. prestige or status, as their use-value, and that 
the phenomenon of sign-value has become an essential constituent of the commodity and 
consumption in contemporary consumer society.5 This can be witnessed from early col-
lectors of Fabergé eggs in 19th century Imperial Russia through to Gen-Z’s obsession with 
the (intentionally falsely scarce and commercially hyped) Supreme brand – everyone 
wants to get in on “the next big thing”, and sometimes that next big thing has value based 
on hype rather than utility. 
 
But how would this translate when working behind a compliance desk at a bank? During 
my time working at the bank, a client had signed up for the first set of weather derivatives 
that I had encountered. For me, it was puzzling. Why would you put an ‘option’ or a 
‘forward’ on the weather? This seemed perplexing and excessive. I thought that this must 
be the first ever occasion that someone convinced someone else to purchase such a prod-
uct. I was sorely mistaken. In fact, weather derivatives had been around since the 1990s as 
a tool that farmers could opt for as opposed to insurance in order to ‘price-in’ certain 
weather affecting their crops – from an unexpected dry season to flooding.6 However, the 
client in this instance was a high-risk hedge fund based in the Cayman Islands that was 
making various bets on what they deemed as high-risk products to receive the highest 
yields for their clients. 
 
At the time, people in the team were only required to make the appropriate anti-money 
laundering (AML), know your client (KYC), market research, due-diligence, contractual 
and legal capacity assessments for us to be comfortable that there were no underlying risks 
we had not considered for the trade to go through. But nowhere within the process was 
it a legal requirement for any team member to demonstrate the requisite knowledge or 
understanding of the product. I simply went out of my way to undertake a form of ‘extra-
curricular’ reading to fully get up to speed with what was being asked of me. This in itself 
is a risk. 
 
			
4  JEAN BAUDRILLARD, FOR A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SIGN, pg 2, (St. Louis, Mo: 
Telos press Ltd., 1981). 
5  Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 7, 2020) 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/baudrillard/. 
6  Sarfraz Thind, As Temperatures Tumble in North America, Weather Derivatives Warm Up, INSTITU-
TIONAL INVESTOR, (Apr. 7, 2020) https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b14zbksjmn4504/as-tem-
peratures-tumble-in-north-america-weather-derivatives-warm-up. 
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The lack of understanding of financial products – be it back or front-office – within bank-
ing has led to catastrophic consequences. During the run-up to the subprime mortgage 
crisis, Fabrice (“Fabulous Fab”) Tourre, a former Goldman Sachs trader, sent an email to 
his girlfriend at the time who was also an employee at the bank in January 2007. His email 
stated: “Only potential survivor, the fabulous Fab ... Standing in the middle of all these 
complex, highly leveraged, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all 
of the implications of those monstrosities!!!” But that wasn’t all. Tourre admitted to his 
lack of understanding of these financial products in yet another email sent in March 2007, 
referring to the financial products he worked on as “pure intellectual masturbation, the 
type of thing which you invent telling yourself: 'Well, what if we created a "thing", which 
has no purpose, which is absolutely conceptual and highly theoretical and which nobody 
knows how to price?’” His understanding of these financial products shows a lack of 
awareness of what they actually are and do. 
 
Recall Baudrillard once again: trading something that no longer holds value in of itself, 
but has value depending on how it communicates the illusion of value; a copy of a copy 
of a copy. Similarly, cryptocurrency wishes to disavow or even transcend conventional 
currency, but is utterly reliant on such currencies as a reference in order to describe how 
they work to prospective investors. Despite their libertarian rhetoric, the jackpot for a 
cryptocurrency is to demonstrate its popularity amongst a core base of early investors such 
that it may be considered a viable option for established financial houses: selling the glam-
our of revolution with the security of the state. However, in the case of these derivatives, 
these tools were not just theoretical; they had serious real consequences that affected real 
people and their lives. Tourre’s emails were admitted in court during a civil case brought 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) after the global financial crisis, where 
he was found guilty for his role in a mortgage deal that cost investors $1 billion. This was 
because of a financial product – Abacus – that was created by the hedge fund Paulson & 
Co. The product is widely known as a collateralized debt obligation (CDO), and thanks 
to various long reads in broadsheet newspapers in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis, and the explanation by pop-star Selina Gomez (with glamorous assistant 
Professor Richard H. Thaler) in the movie ‘The Big Short’, there has been an uptake in 
mainstream understanding of such complex financial instruments. Unfortunately for the 
financial industry, and their compliance analysts, a working knowledge of the risks of cer-
tain products prior to their becoming midwives to misery is infinitely more preferable. 
 
This has been a trend for the derivatives product since its inception. “There is evidence of 
the use of derivatives in the 17th century in Holland and in Japan. Derivatives were already 
considered suspicious.”7 And that isn’t the only example: gambling, betting or speculat-
ing on movements in securities or commodities prices without actually owning the refer-
enced security or commodity was seen as early as 1829, known as ‘stockjobbing’, an early 
version of short-selling which was outlawed in New York. “The Stock Jobbing Act was 
ultimately repealed in 1858 because it was overly broad and captured legitimate forms of 			
7  Gunther Capelle-Blancard. Are Derivatives Dangerous? A Literature Survey, ÉCONOMIE INTERNATIONALE, 
123(3), 67-89 (2010). 
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speculation. However, the question of whether to allow bets on security and commodity 
prices outside of organized exchanges continued to be an issue.”8 
 
Although derivatives might not be inherently dangerous, the suspicion of the tool 
emerges from a lack of complete and utter understanding of what it is and its uses. The 
emergence of powerful new technological breakthroughs and the enhancements of these 
financial products only lead to greater complexity. History has shown us that the more 
complicated financial instruments become, the greater the risk it can pose. A lack of un-
derstanding of what these products are from investors, traders, consumers and regulators 
can lead to damaging consequences. Furthermore, if a product appears unintelligible 
from its marketing materials, a compliance analyst should not be afraid to operate under 
the assumption that this unintelligibility may be deliberate. 
II. LEGAL AND REGULATORY TREATMENT OF CRYTOCURRENCIES 
 
A cryptocurrency is defined as virtual or digital money which takes the form of tokens or 
coins. Financial instrument-wisdom-provider, Investopedia, defines the ‘crypto’ in cryp-
tocurrencies as a complicated cryptography which allows for the creation and processing 
of digital currencies and their transactions across decentralized systems. “Alongside this 
important crypto feature of these currencies is a common commitment to decentraliza-
tion; cryptocurrencies are typically developed as code by teams who build in mechanisms 
for issuance (often, although not always, through a process called “mining”) and other 
controls.”9 
 
Cryptocurrencies and digital coins have a floating reliance on future prestige because the 
idea is that you are investing in something that might derive value in the future and distils 
an air of status once it does appreciate in value in the markets. An extract below from St 
Andrew’s study highlights that the poorer candidates were actually more likely to invest 
in cryptocurrencies, viewing it as aspirational and ahead-of-the-curve. In other words, the 
association with complex financial manoeuvering, of being somebody who knows about 
Bitcoin and willing to put their money where their mouth is, may be a primary motivation 
behind retail client investment, under conditions where they are unable to explain how 
they work. This is not to say that cryptocurrencies do not or will not do what they say 
they will in the future; rather a comprehensive understanding of cryptocurrencies cannot 
be assumed by compliance professionals on the part of the retail investor. More specifi-
cally: 
 
“The average purchasing power parity (PPP)-divided monthly household income per 
capita in the sample is € 1,116.4, with owners and prospective owners of cryptocurrencies 			
8  United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, N. (2009). The role of financial derivatives in the 
current financial crisis: hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States 
Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, second session, pg 75-78 October 14, 2008. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 
9  Jake Frankenfield, Cryptocurrency, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 7, 2020). https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/c/cryptocurrency.asp. 
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being poorer by some €140 per month on average. Individuals intending to own crypto-
currencies in the future have some €237 per month lower income, compared to individ-
uals who have heard but do not intend to own cryptocurrencies.”10 
 
Furthermore, recent studies reveal that “consumer knowledge about digital currencies is 
limited, and cash is still king.”11 The paradox is that “the more financially literate candi-
dates were less likely to own cryptocurrencies and they are more likely not to intend to 
own them in the future.”12 As you can imagine, this is a huge problem for the expansion 
of the industry. Has there ever been a product so heavily lent on by banks and investors 
where the more you learn about the product, the less likely you are to want to invest in or 
use it? The conventional compliance problem is when individuals with specialist exper-
tise, mastery of regulatory loopholes or aspects of a product’s application, try to circum-
vent thorough examination by the compliance analyst or officer. This requires compli-
ance teams to work out what somebody is trying to avoid disclosing and why. In the case 
of cryptocurrency, it may be the case that many investors know as little as any untrained 
analyst. The product could be either an inert purchase made on the assumption that it 
must be a safe bet because of its growing popularity, or a powder keg that requires inten-
sive scrutiny. 
 
In the case of the Abacus scandal, it was only the few at Paulson & Co and Goldman Sachs 
that knew the full intricacies of the product, and this led to a negative perspective on their 
success; they took this knowledge and used it to make “short” positions on the product’s 
overall downfall. The study also shows the inverse as it was “the groups with a lower level 
of knowledge that [were] more open to future adoption.”13 This echoes sentiment felt in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC). Industry reviews, case-law and market 
research after the crash reveals that only a few people in the market knew what a derivative 
was, yet they still traded them profitably for some time. But it is not just the problem of 
traders and their prospective investors. This is a regulatory and policy issue as well, that 
directly correlates to the treatment and understanding of digital currencies. 
 
“With the growth of various kinds of derivatives in the late 20th Century, there was legal 
uncertainty as to whether certain derivatives including credit default swaps violated state 
‘bucket shop’ and gambling laws.”14 In fact, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of 2000 (CFMA) created a safe harbor by pre-empting state and local gaming and ‘bucket 
shop’ laws except for general antifraud provisions and exempting certain derivative trans-
action on commodities and swap agreements including credit default swaps from the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulation. “As the global economy 
slows and the risk of corporate default increases […] recent proposals to regulate CDS 			
10  See also, Panos. G & Karkkainen. T, p.26. 
11  See also, Exton. J. 
12  See also, Panos. G & Karkkainen. T, p.30. 
13  See also, Exton. J. 
14  See also, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Agriculture, N. pg 76-78. 
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markets show limited awareness of the issues,” writes Satyajit Das, former banker and 
treasurer turned consultant and author15. If a regulator does not understand the product 
that they are regulating, then the odds are stacked against the compliance analyst or chief 
compliance officer, as the likelihood of their knowledge on the subject matter is predeter-
mined by people who lacked awareness of the issues surrounding the CDO and sub-prime 
mortgage crisis. 
 
Regulators showed a similar lack of awareness and understanding when trying to regulate 
cryptocurrencies. The SEC deemed virtual currencies to be securities by reason that they 
are investment contracts and the CFTC has classified them as commodities. Other regu-
lators around the globe followed suit with Canada, Finland and other European countries 
viewing them as commodities with additional tax measures. Picture a young compliance 
analyst who has been tasked with covering the commodities trading desks for AML, due-
diligence and other regulatory checks. This analyst has come to grips with the standard 
products that the trading desk usually works with, i.e., gold, oil, energy derivatives or 
physicals. This analyst has since been told to also conduct checks on cryptocurrencies. 
That would not require the same level of skills that this person might have been using for 
this role. They would require training and a complete understanding as to why this has 
been classified as a commodity. They might even miss a few ‘red flag’ elements. This is 
why, despite these products being regulated, lawmakers have not gone far enough. Poli-
cymakers have merely opted to box them into existing categories and groups within pre-
existing regulation. But they should have examined all of the digital currencies closely and 
properly understood these products in order to create bespoke legislation that’s tailor-
made for the industry without ambiguity. Perhaps it should also receive oversight from 
regulators who actually do understand the product – forming a new body featuring legal 
financial technology (fintech) and digital currency specialists. Victor N.A. Metallo, assis-
tant professor of Business Law at Montclair State University agrees with this hypothesis, 
writing: 
 
“A need for such an entity is clear when looking at, for example, Ripple Labs’s (“Rip-
ple”) XRP, a currency designed to work with the existing banking system. Ripple was 
sued over whether XRP is a security requiring registration with the SEC. Ripple main-
tains that XRP is a currency, not a security, because a retail purchaser of the currency 
“does not own rights to the profits or any dividends of the company.” Ripple contends 
all XRP virtual currency have been pre-mined and designed for use by banks as bridge 
assets and can exist without the company. In light of such lawsuits, Congress should 
create a separate entity that would classify each virtual currency as a security or com-
modity and determine which commission, the SEC or CFTC, has oversight.”16 			
15  Satyajit Das, Insight: Credit default swaps and amplified losses, FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 7 2020). 
https://www.ft.com/content/3ee.5e766-08d7-11de-b8b0-0000779fd2ac. 
16  Victor N.A. Metallo, Are They Commodities or Securities? Virtual Currency Markets – Congress Must Create 
A New Regulatory Entity, THE WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE, 44 (Apr. 7, 2020) http://wakeforestlawre-
view.com/2018/09/are-they-commodities-or-securities-virtual-currency-markets-congress-must-create-a-new-
regulatory-entity/. 
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But Metallo’s findings do not go far enough. Virtual currencies should not be classified 
as any existing financial instrument as they are new entities in the market, requiring their 
own definition enshrined in legislation. In fact, a recent decision in March 2020 by the 
Supreme Court in India found that virtual currencies are not commodities. 
 
“The Supreme Court after going through various explanations and definitions from 
different sources, observed that “there is unanimity of opinion among all the regulators 
and the governments of various countries that though virtual currencies have not ac-
quired the status of legal tender, they nevertheless constitute digital representations of 
value and that they are capable of functioning as (i) a medium of exchange and/or (ii) 
a unit of account and/or (iii) a store of value”.17 
 
The court investigated the definition of ‘currency’ as given under various Indian Acts and 
took into consideration judgments from lower courts to get clarity on the question of 
whether virtual currencies are just commodities. The judgment stated that the argument 
of the petitioner, the Internet and Mobile Association of India, that virtual currencies are 
commodities cannot be accepted. Since it is accepted by some institutions as valid pay-
ment for goods and services, “it squarely comes under the purview of the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI).” The ruling adds that: “if an intangible property can act under certain 
circumstances as money (even without faking a currency) then RBI can definitely take 
note of it and deal with it.”18 The courts essentially denied that these financial instruments 
were ‘commodities’, but it did not classify them as ‘money’ either – rather, they were con-
sidered an intangible property that can sometimes get you your groceries. A novel inter-
pretation, but still a bit too ambiguous. 
 
Additionally, to reiterate Metallo’s point on XRP, there is not just one type of digital 
currency. There are several different types of virtual coins and they each come with their 
own prospective risks. Although this article does not seek to name them all in addition to 
their inner operations, it will highlight a few below19: 
• Etherium offers the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) via its platform, a decen-
tralized virtual machine that executes peer-to-peer contracts using a cryptocur-
rency known as ether. 
• Facebook’s Libra, a permissioned blockchain digital currency, which will report-
edly support both existing government-backed currencies, like the US dollar and 
the euro, and the Libra token when it is eventually completed and ready 
to launch. 			
17  Supreme Court of India, Internet and Mobile Association of India (IMAI) v Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
Justices: Aniruddha Bose, R F Nariman, J. Ramasubramanian, (Mar. 4 2020) https://main.sci.gov.in/su-
premecourt/2018/19230/19230_2018_4_1501_21151_Judgement_04-Mar-2020.pdf. 
18  See also, SC judgement, IMAI v RBI, 2020. 
19  Angela Scott-Briggs, 10 Types of Digital Currencies and how they work, TECH BULLION (Apr. 7, 2020) 
https://techbullion.com/10-types-digital-currencies-work/. 
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• Litecoin is a peer-to-peer cryptocurrency released under the MIT/X11 licence. 
• Gemini dollar (GUSD) is an ERC20 stablecoin that allows holders to send and 
receive US dollars across the Ethereum network and can be exchanged for other 
cryptocurrencies on other exchanges offering different trading pairs. 
• Bitcoin, the infamous digital currency created by the Satoshi Nakamoto, which 
can be used to buy items locally and electronically.  
 
One crypto-news website’s definition on Bitcoin states: “as a new user, you can use 
Bitcoin without understanding all its technical details. Once you install a Bitcoin wallet 
on your mobile phone or computer, it will generate the first Bitcoin address and you can 
generate more whenever you need them.”20 Propagating user consent without distilling 
the requisite knowledge on them to fully understand the financial instrument in order to 
make the right decision is a red flag, especially within the compliance industry. But this 
can only be preserved through the lack of awareness from the top of the chain such as 
policy makers and regulators, which trickles down to traders and compliance analysts. It 
is understandable to be a technology consumer and enjoy a company’s products without 
fully understanding how everything goes together (if you broke up my laptop, I would 
struggle to put it back together), but cryptocurrency is unique in the sense that every user 
is also a prefigurative retail client. Even if you do not directly invest in the company, to 
invest in the currency is a similar act, done for similar reasons. To invest in cryptocurrency 
is to invest with the belief of future utility, of future returns. 
 
Legislators and courts world-wide should reconsider what ‘currency’ is within this digital 
age. Although it is well and good that these tools are being regulated, they are not being 
classified correctly. This only increases the likelihood of a compliance malfunction, fraud 
or inappropriate trading behavior as the lack of properly defining a financial instrument 
leaves room for ambiguity. Ambiguity, as shown above, can create risks that should oth-
erwise not exist if someone merely took the time out to understand the product. That 
knowledge can be distilled all the way to a bank’s compliance analyst, who can “tick a box” 
with confidence when authorizing or prohibiting a certain transaction from taking place. 
III. RECENT DEVELOPEMENTS 
 
Aside from the recent Supreme Court ruling in India determining what is and is not a 
virtual currency, the story of the digital coin has flourished over the past two years. Vari-
ous governments and policymakers across the globe have shifted their stance towards au-
thorization of these financial instruments. 
 
The recent UK Budget announcement by Chancellor Rishi Sunak, mentions it “looks 
forward to the Bank of England’s (BoE’s) discussion paper on a potential UK central bank 
			
20  See also, Scott-Briggs, A. 
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digital currency (CBDC).”21 In fact, the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank 
of Japan, the Swiss National Bank and the Sweden’s central bank, have formed an alliance 
with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
to begin the process of reviewing how a digital currency owned by each country’s central 
bank could come into existence. 
 
In March this year, the US dabbled in the creation of a ‘digital dollar’ as Congress was 
putting together the terms of its stimulus package to save the economy from impacts of 
the coronavirus pandemic. The offer by House Democrats included a forward-looking 
kind of stimulus: the creation of a ‘digital dollar’ and the establishment of ‘digital dollar 
wallets.’ However, the final version of the economic stimulus package offered by Speaker 
Nancy Pelosi in the House Democrats, no longer included the US ‘digital dollar’ pro-
posal.22 
 
Russia has also softened its approach towards digital currencies as prime minister Mikhail 
Mishustin introduced a new bill to the country on 17 March 2020 which creates regulatory 
sandboxes to test “digital innovation technologies” such as blockchain and cryptocur-
rency. These products will be exempt from requirements such as mandatory authorised 
capital, fund reserves and reporting to the central bank, and the standards for the maxi-
mum risk per borrower can be cancelled.23 
 
Last year was also a big year for governments testing their own digital currencies. China 
has piloted its digital yuan back in November24 and the Bahamas begun testing its new 
digital Sand Dollar in the same year25. Although Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius 
have not formed any plans for a government-backed digital coin, they are also examining 
the regulation of cryptocurrency as it is still viewed with suspicion and widely viewed as a 
Ponzi scheme26. It was also a year for sanctioned nation states to examine the possibilities 
of a government backed digital currency as North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela and Iran all 			
21  HM Treasury and the Rt Hon Rishi Sunak MP, Budget Speech 2020 (Mar. 11, 2020). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/budget-speech-2020. 
22  Jason Brett, Coronavirus Stimulus Offered By House Financial Services Committee Creates New Digital Dollar, 
FORBES (Ma. 23, 2020). https://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbrett/2020/03/23/new-coronavirus-stimulus-
bill-introduces-digital-dollar-and-digital-dollar-wallets/#59381f5b4bea. 
23  Government House, Moscow, Meeting with deputy prime-ministers (Mar. 16, 2020) http://govern-
ment.ru/en/news/39161/. 
24  Brandon Stewart, Timeline: China’s Digital-Currency (Yuan), Bitcoin And Cryptocurrency, READBTC (Apr. 
7, 2020). https://www.readbtc.com/posts/china-digital-currency-yuan-bitcoin-cryptocurrency-timeline-re-
cent-events. 
25  Michael LaVere, Central Bank of the Bahamas to Launch Its Own Digital Currency 'Sand Dollar', CRYPTO-
GLOBE (Apr. 7, 2020) https://www.cryptoglobe.com/latest/2019/12/central-bank-of-bahamas-launching-
sand-dollar-in-exuma/. 
26  Jen Stolp, Ashlin Perumall, Emma Selfe, Blockchain and Cryptocurrency in Africa, BAKER MCKENZIE (Apr. 
7, 2020), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/files/insight/publications/2019/02/report_blockchai-
nandcryptocurrencyreg_feb2019.pdf. 
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considered this option in the second half of 201927. In fact, in December 2017, Venezuela’s 
president, Nicolas Maduro, announced the launch of an oil-backed cryptocurrency – the 
Petro. Maduro made the Petro the “official alternate currency” in the country and report-
edly issued 100 million tokens. The Petro was launched in pre-sale in February 2018 and 
in December, Maduro told state-run media that Venezuela had a schedule for selling oil 
in Petros during 2019 as part of an effort to bypass channels that involve US dollars.28 
IV. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
 
The above notion of sanctioned countries being able to use cryptocurrencies to assist its 
citizens comes at an advantage for people who can send and receive money abroad using 
this tool to pay for their bills and groceries. The advent of cryptocurrency has been a wel-
come product for these nations as it creates a solution to financial exclusion. Cuba’s econ-
omy minister, Alejandro Gil Fernandez, said the government was consulting with aca-
demics to study the potential use of cryptocurrency for its national and international 
commercial transactions, while the country’s president, Migual Diaz-Canel, announced 
the plan would raise capital for around one quarter of the population, helping to pay for 
reforms during a public address on local television29. This is a similar approach taken to 
that of Iran, despite its top legislators being highly dismissive of the product until a con-
ference with business leaders last year. Although this benefits the citizens of these coun-
tries under sanctions, it would pose difficult questions for those in the compliance indus-
try working within an institution that adheres to US sanctions. 
 
There are also potential risks for these nations caused by a lack of transparency surround-
ing digital currencies. As mentioned above, Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria and Mauritius have all 
been weighing up the potential pros and cons of a virtual currency which is still met with 
great distrust in the continent. Due to the lack of transparency within these products, it 
has been easy for scammers and fraudsters to manipulate the system for their advantage, 
and Africa has been a prime target for these perpetrators. 
 
On a popular BBC podcast, ‘The Missing Cryptoqueen’30, the broadcasting crew discover 
that Dr. Ruja Ignatova, aka “the Cryptoqueen”, had managed to defraud her users for 
millions of pounds all under the guise of being the next Bitcoin. “Investors often told us 
that what drew them in initially was the fear that they would miss out on the next big 
thing. They'd read, with envy, the stories of people striking gold with Bitcoin and thought 			
27  Katherine Kirkpatrick, Christine E. Savage, Russell Johnston, Matthew B. Hanson, Virtual Currency in Sanc-
tioned Jurisdictions, KING & SPALDING (Apr 7, 2020), https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/virtual-
currency-in-sanctioned-jurisdictions#_edn2. 
28  See also, Kilpatrick K, Savage C, Johnston R & Hanson M. 
29  Marie Huillet, Cubans Are Turning to Bitcoin to Access Global Economy: Report, COINTELEGRAPH, (Sep. 13, 
2019).https://cointelegraph.com/news/cubans-are-turning-to-bitcoin-to-access-global-economy-report. 
30  Jamie Bartlett, Cryptoqueen: How this woman scammed the world, then vanished, BBC (Nov. 24, 2019). 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-50435014. 
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OneCoin was a second chance,”31 according to Jamie Bartlett, reporter and podcaster at 
the BBC. This highlights Baudrillard’s point about the sign-value as people wanted to get 
on the “next big thing” based off hype alone. Even being told to their faces by reporters 
that they were victims of a proven fraud and that there was an international arrest warrant 
out for the very person that had convinced them to part with their cash was not enough 
to dissuade locals. A combination of the anchoring effect, the sunk cost fallacy and the 
growing political distrust of interloping proscriptive elites lays the ideological ground-
work for this type of scheme to operate effectively, acquiring an arguably cult-like follow-
ing of supporters as emotionally invested in the OneCoin revolution as much as any fi-
nancial investment made. 
 
Dr. Ignatova managed to launch her OneCoin product in a remote village in Uganda, 
despite there being publicized revelations in the Western international press flagging it as 
a potential scam. This illustrates the study by St Andrews that poorer candidates – as 
those in the Ntangamo region of Uganda were – wanted to invest in something new 
which can get them out of their current situation. Bartlett wrote: “In Europe, less money 
was invested in the first six months of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016. But in 
Africa, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, it was the other way around. As the 
money started drying up in Europe, promoters turned more and more to countries like 
Uganda.”32 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK issued a warning to in-
vestors about the risks OneCoin poses on its website. But how was someone in the Ntan-
gamo region of Uganda supposed to find that out? Western sellers of OneCoin sold the 
dream to those living in remote towns in the Global South; taking their own lack of trans-
parency and the user’s lack of awareness to their advantage. And that was not the only 
scam that scared off potential CBDC’s in the continent. 
 
• Mavrodi Mundial Moneybox (MMM), founded by Sergei Mavrodi, a convicted 
Russian fraudster, approached the African market and took advantage of 
Bitcoin’s promise to free people from banks and social inequality. “In both Ni-
geria and Kenya, MMM claimed to be a mutual fund platform where users 
would contribute their bitcoin to a common funding pool and, in turn, realise 
50% returns on their investments.” This turned out to be a Ponzi scheme.33 
• In South Africa, thousands of people lost more than $80 million total in a bitcoin 
swindle orchestrated by BTC Global, a bitcoin trading company. “The company 
targeted members of the public and urged them to invest with a promise of 2% 
interest daily, 14% weekly and 50% monthly. However, after two weeks of oper-
ation, the company closed shop and fled with millions in investments.”34 			
31  See also, Bartlett. J. 
32  See also, Bartlett. J. 
33  Steven Weru, Bitcoin Scams In Africa: Their History And How To Avoid Becoming A Victim, BITCOIN 
MAGAZINE, (Jul. 19, 2019) https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bitcoin-scams-in-africa-their-history-and-
how-to-avoid-becoming-a-victim. 
34  See also, Weru S. 
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• Velox 10 was able to draw in thousands of Kenyans, with some claiming to have 
lost as much as $30,000 (3,000,000 KES). To join the investment outfit, mem-
bers were required to pay a registration fee of $100, after which they were prom-
ised daily returns of $4,000.35 
 
These scams show that it is not a surprise that countries like Nigeria and Kenya are not 
running into the arms of issuing their own digital currencies so fast, and instead consider 
enforcing AML protocols first. As lawyers based in King & Spalding suggest, “exchanges, 
as well as other crypto participants, such as wallet providers, asset managers, and financial 
institutions, should strengthen AML and CFT frameworks, along with associated KYC 
procedures, to ensure that cryptocurrency business lines comply.”36 
 
Scams and a lack of transparency are also not the only issues at hand when considering the 
use of cryptocurrency. As the world is moving towards more sustainable and environ-
mentally friendly applications and systems, it should be noted that bitcoin “consumes 
more energy than the entire nation of Switzerland,”37 according to new estimates pub-
lished by researchers at the University of Cambridge. The Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity 
Consumption Index38 highlights how the global Bitcoin network is consuming more than 
seven gigwatts of electricity. “Over the course of a year that’s equal to around 64 TWh or 
terawatt hours of energy consumption. That’s more than the country of Switzerland uses 
over the same time period (58 TWh per year), but less than Colombia (68 TWh per 
year).”39 With this is in mind, if countries started rolling out large cryptocurrency projects, 
the energy consumption would only increase, making the world less energy efficient. The 
European Commission released its Disclosure Regulation, which was published in the EU 
Official Journal in December 2019. It forms part of a package of measures announced by 
the European Commission to improve firms' consideration of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) issues as part of their decision-making processes. The purpose of the 
Disclosure Regulation is to achieve more transparency on how financial market partici-
pants and advisers consider sustainability risks in their investment decisions and insurance 
or investment advice. As a compliance manager or broker-dealer, it would be hard to jus-
tify these high energy figures on the sustainability disclosure regulations issued by the EU. 
Sustainability should not just be a buzzword used in conferences or seen as what the youth 
of today form strikes about. It is something that the financial industry should take seri-
ously as it plays a huge role in adding to pollution, so it should make up for its past mis-
takes by ensuring ESG matters are properly explored. 			
35  See also, Weru S. 
36  See also, Kirkpatrick K, Savage C, Johnston R, Hanson M. 
37  James Vincent, Bitcoin consumes more energy than Switzerland, according to new estimate, THE VERGE (Jul. 4, 
2019). https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/4/20682109/bitcoin-energy-consumption-annual-calculation-cam-
bridge-index-cbeci-country-comparison. 
38  Cambridge Bitcoin Electricity Consumption Index (CBECI), Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, Uni-
versity of Cambridge Judge Business School. 
39  See also, Vincent J. 
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
If digital coins were going to develop a way of being drastically more energy efficient, hone 
in on scammers, become more transparent and provide potential users – from employees 
within trading institutions to your average retail investor – with the requisite knowledge 
and expertise on the product, then it might have a promising future. But first the industry 
as a whole must come together to address these issues. The unintelligibility and unfamil-
iarity of its technological innovations with the layperson, their popularity with first-time 
retail clients without adequate financial literacy, the prevalence of multiple cryptocur-
rency scams that exploits the aforementioned intelligibility, and the inherent volatility of 
products that are bought on the basis of projected brand legitimacy, are all factors that 
must be addressed within the industry, and known to all compliance analysts engaging 
with these financial products today. If the current trends in cryptocurrency as a popular 
financial product continue with a similar makeup of client investors, then we all need to 
finally know how Plumbuses are made. 
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Books related to the digital transformation of law - especially legal tech - have been spring-
ing up like mushrooms since about 2018 and continue to do so today.1  They reflect the 
great interest of the legal profession in these topics. With New Suits a further, particularly 
impressive volume has been added. 
 
Apart from the well-known American lawyer series, the title recalls the famous works of 
Richard Susskind, in particular Tomorrow`s Lawyers. An Introduction to your Future 
(Second Edit., 2017) and The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services 
(2010). Furthermore, the book already impresses optically with 710 pages and a cover, on 
which - separated by a blood-red dividing line - on one side a suit-wearer with a tie and on 
the other side a punk with a Bitcoin button on his leather jacket can be seen. It quickly 
becomes apparent: In the still very conventional legal book market, signs are yet to be set. 
 
Even the structure is innovative: In Part 1, the question as to why “Lawyers […] Need 
New Suits” is posed. Part 2 describes “What New Suits Might Lawyers Need for the Fu-
ture”. Finally, the general question of Part 3 is: “How Will Lawyers Fit into The New 
Suits of the Future?”.  
 
Part 1 consists of eleven single chapters. They describe a colorful bouquet of develop-
ments, both with regard to changes in the working methods of legal advisors as well as 
external factors and new business models. Chapter 1, written by David B Wilkins and Ma-
ría José Esteban Ferrer, starts with Alternative Legal Service Providers. External actors also 
play a role in Chapter 5, authored by Christoph Küng, where Legal Marketplaces and 
Platforms are the subject. Karl J Paadam and Priit Martinson devote their important 
Chapter 10 to developments in the judiciary and administration: e-Government & e-Jus-
tice: Digitizations of Registers, IDs and Justice Procedures. 
One thematic focus is the attorney's working methods and consulting services in selected 
areas. In Chapter 6, for example, Karl Koller describes the possibilities of using technology 
in the Practice of Real Estate Transactions, also known as Property Tech (PropTech). 
Chapters 7 (author: Marc O Morant), 9 (authors: Michael Grupp, Micha-Manuel Bues) 
and 11 (authors: Christian Öhner, Silke Graf) inform the reader about Gig/Contingent 			
1  I have attempted a constantly updated list of all (German and English) legal monographs, manuals and vol-
umes in the field of Legal Tech, E-Government & E-Justice under bitly.com/legaltechdokz. 
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Workforce Models, Legal Automation and Lawyer Bots. Probably the most important 
chapter in times of the worldwide outbreak of the corona virus (some people might think 
of #FlattenTheCurve2 when looking at the graphic on p. 302) is provided by Eva Maria 
Baumgartner, without having suspected this at the time of its origin. In Chapter 8 (“Vir-
tual Lawyering - Lawyers In The Cloud”), she provides a Survival Kit for Lawyers in the 
Cloud Computing Universe. Baumgartner quite rightly points out that, “with cloud com-
puting, gathering and distribution of information is excessively enhanced, making it more 
impactful than any other information technology of our time”.3 One might hope that in 
practice the necessary steps have already been taken using the Survival Kit before law of-
fices were closed and (as in China and Italy) curfews imposed. In any case, the author sees 
“lots of room for organizations such as the bars and disciplinary organizations to move 
towards the cloud and help members to clearly understand requirements to be able to 
move forward with their clients”.4 
Finally, Part 1 also contains more cross-cutting issues: From Innovation (Chapter 3, au-
thor: Michele DeStefano) to Legal Professionals of the Future (Chapter 4, author: John 
Flood) to Corporate Legal Departments, in particular The Changing Role of General 
Counsel (Chapter 2, author: Mari Sako). 
 
The topics from Part 1 are closely interwoven with those from Part 2. The distinction is 
not readily apparent, but this does not affect the relevance of the chapters. There, legal 
publishers are also heard as a professional group beyond legal consultancy in Chapter 14, 
written by Simon Ahammer. In parallel with Chapter 6 (PropTech), David Bundi and 
Marcel Lötscher each devote their Chapters 18 and 19 to the financial industry (Regulatory 
Technology - RegTech) and the use of RegTech for supervisory agencies (SupTech).  
Part 2 also focuses on new basic technologies in general and the working methods of law-
yers in particular. In Chapter 15, Rolf H Weber describes Smart Contracts and What the 
Blockchain Has Got to Do with It. David Fisher and Pierson Grider provide a transfer of 
the Blockchain topic to the legal sector (outside the regulatory framework) in Chapter 16. 
Especially worth reading in this context is also Chapter 21, authored by Luis Ackermann. 			
2  Chow/Abbruzzese, NBC News, 11/03/2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/what-flatten-
curve-chart-shows-how-critical-it-everyone-fight-n1155636. 
3  Eva Baumgartner, Virtual Lawyering—­Lawyers In The Cloud, in: New Suits 223 (Michele DeStefano, Guen-
ther Dobrauz-Saldapenna, 1st ed. 2019). 
4  Eva Baumgartner, Virtual Lawyering—­Lawyers In The Cloud, in: New Suits 223 (Michele DeStefano, Guen-
ther Dobrauz-Saldapenna, 1st ed. 2019). 
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He is concerned with Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Legal Systems and provides 
readers with valuable advice: “Act now, from a position of strength, rethink your IT strat-
egy, free from preconceptions, and be bold enough to not only consider radical change 
but actually realize it”5. Chapters that are particularly practical, as they concern themselves 
with day-to-day work, are Chapter 17 (authors: Juan Crosby, Mike Rowden, Craig Mcke-
own, Sebastian Ahrens) concerning eDiscovery, Chapter 20 (author: Antonios Koumbar-
akis) concerning Legal Research and Chapter 22 (authors: Christian Öhner, Silke Graf) 
concerning Automated Legal Documents. 
Furthermore, two Chapters follow a more general approach. Guenther Dobrauz-Sal-
dapenna and Corsin Derungs focus on Innovation, Disruption, or Evolution in the Legal 
World (Chapter 12). In Chapter 13, Matthias Trummer, Ulf Klebeck and Guenther Do-
brauz-Saldapenna cover the Legal Value Chain. 
 
Part 3 has a clearer focus, namely on the future-oriented change in job and requirement 
profiles (mindsets and skillsets) as well as new business models in the law (firm) sector. 
Under these aspects there are also comments on Legal Procurement (Chapter 25, written 
by Silvia Hodges Silverstein and Lena Campagna) as well as Restructuring Law (Chapter 
26, authored by Tom Braegelmann). 
Maurus Schreyvogel opens Part 3 with Chapter 23: Fix What Ain’t Broken (Yet). Similar 
lines are followed by Jordan Urstadt in Chapter 24 (topic: Strategy for Legal Products of 
Law Firms), Philipp Rosenauer and Steve Hafner in Chapter 27 (topic: Managed Legal 
Services) and Salvatore Iacangelo in Chapter 30 (topic: Future of Law Firms). Chapters 
28, 29, 31 and 32, on the other hand, put more emphasis on the competences and charac-
teristics of the individual. They deal with Legal Hackers (authors: Jameson Dempsey, 
Lauren Mack, Phil Weiss), New Jobs in an Old Profession (authors: Noah Waisberg, Will 
Pangborn), Collaboration and Leadership (author: Michele DeStefano) and - last but not 
least - Diversity (author: Maria Leistner).  
 
The fact that the book deals with diversity in the legal industry (and what this topic has 
to do with a lack of innovation and of young talents, too) is exemplary for the far-sighted 
and outstandingly innovative approach. Often enough it is still wrongly anchored in peo-
ple's minds: Diversity is not just about gender. Leistner also makes this clear and refers 			
5  Luis Ackermann, Artificial ­Intelligence and Advanced Legal Systems, in: New Suits 492 (Michele DeStefano, 
Guenther Dobrauz-Saldapenna, 1st ed. 2019). 
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above all to race and age.6 She convincingly points out that technological changes will as-
sist in attracting more diverse lawyers to teams, “creating the environment that helps them 
drive: an environment that is not based on selling hours and presenteeism, but value add-
ing, with advice being able to be provided ‘on the go’ and through advanced methods of 
communication”.7 I look forward to these changes and to such an important chapter be-
ing placed further ahead in a new edition of the book. 
 
Overall, a must-read for all those – academics and practitioners alike – who are concerned 
with the future of legal advice and want to be provided with an “international, multi-
cultural map of the legal jungle (…) by putting together the voices of legal thought-leaders 
from around the world”8. The readers can expect a wide range of topics full of high-qual-
ity articles. Comprehensive and fundamental articles provide the necessary basis of 
knowledge. Thematically more specific articles and particularly beneficial international 
aspects lead to even the "advanced" legal techies getting their money's worth. After reading 
this, the legal professionals should get even more excited about fitting their New Suits. 
			
6  Maria Leistner, The Importance of Diversity, in: New Suits 658 (Michele DeStefano, Guenther Dobrauz-Sal-
dapenna, 1st ed. 2019). 
7  Maria Leistner, The Importance of Diversity, in: New Suits 666 (Michele DeStefano, Guenther Dobrauz-Sal-
dapenna, 1st ed. 2019). 
8  Michele DeStefano & Guenther Dobrauz-Saldapenna, Curators’ Foreword in: New Suits 8 (Michele DeSte-
fano, Guenther Dobrauz-Saldapenna, 1st ed. 2019). 
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Jack Newton, the author of the work, is the CEO and co-founder of Clio, the largest 
cloud-based practice management platform for attorneys and other legal practitioners, 
which is based in Canada. Newton is regarded as a pioneer in this area and uses his expe-
rience to resolve security, ethical and data protection issues in connection with cloud com-
puting for the legal community and, in particular, the legal consultancy professions. He 
is an internationally recognized author and speaker. For those reasons alone, the work 
“The Client-Centered Law Firm: How to Succeed in an Experience-Driven World”, 
which appeared in January 2020, deserves particular attention. 
 
Newton is not the only person to address the subject of how legal firms can cast off their 
old apparel and adapt to a modern world characterized by speed, technology and digitiza-
tion. Over the last three years, in particular, the pressure to change as a result of legal tech 
and digitization in general has become an ever expanding topic and has been tackled by 
several authors. In addition to Newton, for example, Michele DeStefano in her work “Le-
gal Upheaval”1, published in 2018, and Michele DeStefano and Guenther Dobrauz-Sal-
dapenna in their collection of essays “New Suits: Appetite for Disruption in the Legal 
World” (2019) have focused on this topic and on the impact of legal tech and digitization.2 
The latter work also identifies issues of gender and diversity as drivers of innovation. 
 
Newton gives a very practical insight into the modern legal practice and a guide with ideas 
on how to create a “client-centered” practice. The book runs to 267 pages and is divided 
into three parts, which can be summarized by the questions: “What is a ‘client-centered’ 
legal practice?”, “Why is it important to be ‘client-centered’?” and “How does a ‘client-
centered’ legal practice function?”. 
 
In the first part, Newton explains why the legal market has changed and why it makes 
sense to pursue a client-centered approach in an experience-oriented world. In the pro-
cess, comparisons are made between legal practices and legal practitioners and other cus-
tomer-focused companies, such as Starbucks, Uber and AirBnB. In this way, Newton 
shows that, although there are different expectations of legal practices than of the compa-
nies mentioned, legal practitioners and, in particular, attorneys find themselves at a wa-
tershed where they have to concentrate not only on professionalism and legal competence 
in the narrower sense, but also on changing consumer and client requirements. He men-
tions the change in client attitude, the different approach of potential clients when look-
ing for an attorney and the – at least subliminal – expectations with regard to the consul-
tancy service, which must be fast, personal and, above all, practical. However, client-cen-
tered does not mean client-first. Newton uses the latter term to refer to a solution pre-
sented on a silver platter, when the client has only ordered a milkshake to go. He talks of 
overkill of legal information in this connection, which clients struggle to process and 			
1  See also the review of DeStefano by Schneider: Legal Upheaval: A Guide to Creativity, Collaboration and 
Innovation in Law, CEJ, 4, 2, p. 79 ff. (2018). 
2  See also the review of DeStefano & Dobrauz-Saldapenna by Leeb: New Suits: Appetite for Disruption in the 
Legal World, in this issue. 
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which cannot be applied to their businesses. Client-centered solutions are tailor-made le-
gal solutions, in the implementation of which the client is supported, but which are just 
as legally robust as other detailed expert reports. The author stresses here how a client-
centered legal practice can develop an entirely new dynamism and power, allowing it to 
begin the process of growing and flourishing again. Newton also says that the experience 
of the client plays a very important part in this context and that the latter is not just paying 
for the end product and the legal advice, but also for the experience with the attorney or 
legal practitioner. 
 
The second part explains what it means to run a client-centered legal practice. Newton 
identifies five core values (Develop Deep Client Empathy, Practice Attentiveness, Gener-
ate Ease with Communication, Demand Effortless Experiences and Create Clients for 
Life) and a client-centered mentality, all of which are constructive here. This is not only 
explained theoretically, but also developed according to a plan that illustrates the various 
stages that the client goes through, from the contact search through to the solution to the 
problem and payment of the bill. Development of a deep empathy is of crucial im-
portance for a client-centered firm in this context. 
 
In the final part, Newton provides the reader with a tool kit for implementing a sustain-
able change to a client-centered legal practice. He explains how processes and tools can be 
used effectively and how the team can be encouraged to adopt a client-centered mentality. 
He also gives tips on how to measure success and handle feedback from clients. This final 
step puts the wheels of success in motion and is the driver for internal efficiency and 
growth of the client base, making those wheels turn ever faster. 
 
The book gives a very good and detailed overview of what client-centered means and how 
it can be implemented. In doing so, it consistently and very clearly highlights the two 
complementary perspectives on one problem of the client and the service provider. As 
every firm has a slightly different set of priorities and focuses on different points, strategic 
factors are placed in the foreground, rather than concrete ways of addressing clients in the 
form of a guide to acquisition. The author also has empathy for his own target audience: 
attorneys are always under personal pressure and are expected to make the impossible pos-
sible. This pressure is too much for most people and is a source of stress and burn-out. 
Although the book cannot neutralize that pressure, it takes the reader on a very enjoyable 
journey in showing how to deal with and possibly reduce it. 
 
It does not matter what professional role the reader plays (from secretary to partner, from 
a big law firm to a specialist boutique practice) or how long they have been working there. 
What is important is a willingness to embrace change and to take this step oneself. That 
is one of the most important pieces of advice that the book has given me personally. I have 
identified points which we have already dealt with intuitively in a “client-centered” and 
thus correct way, as Newton sees it, and at the same time I can see other ways of optimiz-
ing this approach. Newton’s work provides motivation to move in that direction. His ex-
planations are authentic and colorful, and they inspire self-analysis and reconsideration. 
You simply have to be prepared to think a little outside of the box in which you are put 
even as a student. 
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In conclusion, this book is definitely worth reading for anyone who is involved with the 
future of legal tech and client-centered legal practices and is looking for inspiration and 
ideas. It does not matter what part they play – or would like to play – in the overall scheme 
of things, the key is a willingness to change in some way. 
